Maya angrily shoves Noor outside a club. Noor falls and breaks her wrist. Maya says, “I only meant to push her away, not injure her.”

1. Treat the shove as possible actus reus because it is a direct application of force to Noor.
2. Treat the broken wrist as legally significant harm, raising possible liability under s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
3. Use R v Savage; Parmenter (1991): Savage threw beer and the glass injured the victim; Parmenter injured his baby by rough handling. The principle is that s47 requires intention or recklessness as to assault or battery, not intention or recklessness as to the actual bodily harm.
4. Frame the issues as questions: did Maya commit a battery, did that battery cause actual bodily harm, and did she at least intend or foresee the unlawful force?

Sam takes Priya’s laptop from her bag, puts it in his own bag, and plans to sell it online.

1. Choose the relevant rule: s1 Theft Act 1968 because the facts involve taking another person’s property.
2. Test the external elements: Sam assumes the rights of an owner, so there is appropriation under s3 Theft Act 1968; a laptop is property under s4 Theft Act 1968; it belongs to Priya under s5 Theft Act 1968.
3. Test dishonesty: Ivey v Genting Casinos (2017), involving a gambler using edge-sorting in a casino, gives the modern approach to dishonesty by considering the defendant’s belief about the facts and then whether ordinary decent people would see the conduct as dishonest.
4. Test intention permanently to deprive: Sam plans to sell the laptop, so he is treating it as his own to dispose of permanently.
5. Conclude that theft is likely if the prosecution can prove those elements beyond reasonable doubt.

A shopkeeper displays a prohibited knife in the window with a price label. The statute makes it an offence to “offer for sale” that type of knife.

1. Start with the statutory phrase “offer for sale” because liability depends on that wording.
2. Apply the literal rule using contract law meaning: a shop display is an invitation to treat, meaning an invitation for customers to make an offer, not an offer itself.
3. Compare the facts with Fisher v Bell (1961), where the same kind of display did not amount to an offer for sale.
4. Conclude that, on a literal interpretation, the shopkeeper is unlikely to be liable, even if that outcome seems to weaken public protection.

A sealed bottle of juice contains glass. The consumer drinks it and cuts her mouth.

1. Extract the ratio decidendi from Donoghue v Stevenson (1932): a manufacturer can owe a duty of care to a consumer where the product reaches them without reasonable opportunity for inspection.
2. Compare the material facts: both cases involve a sealed drink, a hidden defect, and physical injury to the consumer.
3. Apply the principle: the manufacturer should reasonably foresee that contaminated bottled juice could injure the ultimate consumer.
4. Conclude that a duty of care is likely, unless later facts show the defect was introduced after manufacture.

Police officers arrest a suspect in a busy street. During the arrest, they knock into Ollie, who falls and is injured.

1. Issue: decide whether the police may owe Ollie a duty of care in negligence for a positive act causing physical injury.
2. Rule: use Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (2018), where police officers knocked over an elderly passer-by during an arrest; the Supreme Court held that ordinary negligence principles could apply to police positive acts.
3. Application: Ollie, like the claimant in Robinson, is a passer-by injured during a physical arrest, so the harm is foreseeable and closely connected to the officers’ conduct.
4. Conclusion: a duty of care is likely, though breach and causation would still need separate analysis.

A police-operated drone malfunctions during an arrest and injures a passer-by. There is no exact drone case.

1. Acknowledge the gap: there is no clear precedent specifically on police drones, so the argument must use the nearest principles.
2. Compare with Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (2018): the injury results from a positive police act during an arrest, so ordinary negligence principles may apply.
3. Address Caparo v Dickman (1990), where investors relied on audited accounts and the court used foreseeability, proximity, and whether it was fair, just and reasonable for a novel duty. After Robinson, Caparo is not a universal checklist for every duty question.
4. Build the strongest view: because the facts involve direct physical injury from police activity, Robinson is the closer authority and a duty is arguable.
5. Counter the alternative: if the claim were about police failing to prevent a third party’s crime, the duty argument would be weaker and distinguishable.

Proposition: the doctrine of precedent makes the law too rigid.

1. Support the proposition: binding precedent promotes consistency, but Young v Bristol Aeroplane (1944) shows that the Court of Appeal is usually bound by its own decisions, which can make correction slow.
2. Develop the counterargument: precedent also supports the rule of law, the idea that law should be clear, predictable and applied consistently.
3. Add flexibility: courts can distinguish cases, and higher courts can overrule. In R v R (1991), involving a husband charged with raping his wife, the House of Lords recognised that the old marital rape exemption no longer applied, showing common law development.
4. Reach a judgement: precedent is not simply too rigid; its strength is stability, but it depends on appeal courts using their powers carefully to keep law fair and modern.