An insurance provider faces two distinct market failures arising from asymmetric information:
To combat these, the provider introduces Policy A (requiring a comprehensive medical history report and examination before a policy is issued) and Policy B (introducing a £250 excess/co-payment for every medical claim).
Which of the following correctly pairs the situations with their corresponding market failure and the policy designed to mitigate them?
Situation 1 is adverse selection, addressed by Policy A (screening); Situation 2 is moral hazard, addressed by Policy B (incentive alignment).
Situation 1 is moral hazard, addressed by Policy A (signalling); Situation 2 is adverse selection, addressed by Policy B (incentive alignment).
Situation 1 is adverse selection, addressed by Policy B (incentive alignment); Situation 2 is moral hazard, addressed by Policy A (screening).
Situation 1 is moral hazard, addressed by Policy B (screening); Situation 2 is adverse selection, addressed by Policy A (signalling).
45 exam-style questions on AQA A Level Economics 1.2 Individual economic decision making (A-level only), covering 1.2.1 Consumer behaviour, 1.2.2 Imperfect information, 1.2.3 Aspects of behavioural economic theory, and 1.2.4 Behavioural economics and economic policy. Each one has a worked solution and a mark scheme showing where the marks go.