Objectives Often Conflict
- Macroeconomic objectives can conflict, so pursuing one may worsen another.
- A trade-off means gaining more of one objective only by giving up some of another.
- Lower unemployment can come with higher inflation as demand rises.
- Faster growth can worsen the current account as imports rise.
- Faster growth can also raise pollution and deplete scarce resources.
- Cutting a fiscal deficit can slow growth and raise unemployment.
- Finite productive capacity means not every objective can be met at once.
- Many trade-offs bind hardest in the short run.
- Supply-side gains can ease some conflicts over the long run.
The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off
Short-run Phillips curve: a curve showing an inverse relationship between the rate of inflation and unemployment in the short run.
Natural rate of unemployment: the rate of unemployment when the labour market clears, at which inflation is stable.
- Boosting demand to cut unemployment tends to raise inflation, and tightening to cut inflation raises unemployment.
- In the long run the Phillips curve is vertical at the natural rate of unemployment, so the trade-off disappears.
- This is why supply-side reform, not demand policy, lowers unemployment in the long run.
- A boom that pushes unemployment very low can lift demand-pull inflation.
- Rapid growth can pull in imports and widen a current-account deficit.
- The clash between growth and the environment drives the debate over sustainable growth.
Short Run Against Long Run
- In the short run, finite capacity forces sharp trade-offs.
- In the long run, higher potential output can loosen them.
- Supply-side policy can raise capacity and reduce some conflicts.
- But supply-side measures work only slowly and their effect is uncertain.
Problems Facing Policymakers
- Even a well-designed policy faces practical problems that limit what it can achieve.
- Time lags mean a policy acts only after a recognition, decision and implementation delay.
- A stimulus decided in a downturn may arrive only after recovery has begun, making policy pro-cyclical.
- Inaccurate forecasts and poor data mean policymakers act on an uncertain, out-of-date picture.
- Figures such as GDP are revised long after they are first published.
- The response of households and firms to a policy is hard to predict.
- These problems make precise fine-tuning of the economy unrealistic.
- A policy built on the wrong forecast can do more harm than good.
Constraints on Policy
Transfer pricing: where a multinational sets the internal prices charged between its own divisions to shift profits to low-tax countries.
Automatic stabilisers: features of the budget, such as taxes and benefits, that dampen the cycle without any new government decision.
- Limited policy room can bind, as very low interest rates leave little scope to cut further.
- A high deficit and debt limit the scope for further fiscal support.
- External shocks such as an oil price spike or a world recession lie outside a government's control.
- The power of transnational corporations can weaken domestic policy.
- Through transfer pricing they shift profits to low-tax countries, reducing tax revenue.
- The threat of relocation can push governments to soften taxes or regulation.
- A government runs a deficit of £60bn while GDP is £2,000bn, and its fiscal rule caps borrowing at 3% of GDP.
- That deficit is 3% of GDP, so the rule is already binding and leaves little room for extra fiscal stimulus in a downturn.
- Governments can push back through international cooperation, such as global minimum tax agreements.
- Automatic stabilisers and independent forecasters can also reduce mistakes, though they cannot remove uncertainty.
Are these conflicts a permanent barrier to good policy?
- The conflicts are real and often bind: with finite capacity, cutting unemployment or boosting growth can raise inflation or widen the current-account deficit, and time lags, poor data and limited fiscal or monetary room can turn even well-judged policy pro-cyclical.
- But the constraints are not absolute: supply-side reform can raise potential output and loosen the trade-offs over time, automatic stabilisers and independent forecasters reduce mistakes, and international cooperation such as a global minimum tax can blunt the power of transnational corporations.
- On balance, the conflicts limit what demand policy can do in the short run but are not a permanent barrier: how far they bite depends on the time horizon, the economy's spare capacity and the quality of institutions, so realistic policy manages the trade-offs rather than expecting to remove them.
- Name the two objectives in tension and the mechanism that links them.
- Separate the short-run trade-off from the long-run picture.
- Group the practical problems into lags, poor data, conflicts and limited room.
- Judge how far each constraint actually bites in the given context.
- Do not assume all objectives can be achieved at the same time, since finite capacity creates short-run trade-offs.
- Do not confuse the constraints on policy with government failure itself, as constraints are why policy is hard while failure is the poor outcome that can result.
- What is a trade-off between objectives, and why do most conflicts arise?
- How does the short-run Phillips curve show the inflation-unemployment conflict?
- Why do time lags make fine-tuning difficult?
- How can transfer pricing constrain a government?
- Give one way conflicts and constraints can be eased.