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An absolute majority of over 50% is not required."},{"text":"majority of votes","correct":false,"explanation":"First Past the Post does not require a candidate to receive over half of all votes. The candidate with the most votes wins, even with only a plurality."},{"text":"most second preferences","correct":false,"explanation":"Confusing First Past the Post with a preferential system makes second preferences seem decisive. In fact, only first-choice votes are counted, and the candidate with the most votes wins."},{"text":"widest local support","correct":false,"explanation":"First Past the Post is determined by votes rather than geographical coverage within a constituency. The seat goes to the candidate with the most votes overall."}]},{"id":"80426adf-68fa-4f9a-b43b-ceb69df2c360","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What can First Past the Post do to a party with only a plurality of votes?","back":"It can turn a plurality into a large Commons majority.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It can turn a plurality into a large Commons majority.","correct":true,"explanation":"First Past the Post can exaggerate the leading party’s advantage because seats are won constituency by constituency. A plurality of national votes can therefore produce a substantial Commons majority."},{"text":"It can turn a plurality into a small Commons minority.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the usual disproportional effect of First Past the Post. Rather than converting a plurality into a minority government, it can turn that vote lead into a large Commons majority."},{"text":"It can turn a plurality into an equal share of seats.","correct":false,"explanation":"First Past the Post does not allocate seats proportionally to national vote share. Its constituency contests can amplify a plurality, converting it into a large Commons majority."},{"text":"It can turn a plurality into an absolute majority of votes.","correct":false,"explanation":"A plurality means the largest vote share, not necessarily more than half of all votes. First Past the Post can transform that plurality into a large Commons majority."}]},{"id":"876c820e-9d19-4339-95d1-7c4186b1fbdc","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What was the central issue in the 2019 general election?","back":"Brexit.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Brexit.","correct":true,"explanation":"The 2019 election was dominated by Brexit, particularly Boris Johnson’s promise to “Get Brexit Done” after prolonged parliamentary deadlock over the UK’s departure from the EU."},{"text":"Austerity.","correct":false,"explanation":"Austerity remained part of the wider political context, but it was not the central issue of the 2019 campaign. Brexit and resolving the parliamentary deadlock dominated the election."},{"text":"Scottish independence.","correct":false,"explanation":"Scottish independence was especially important in Scotland but did not define the UK-wide 2019 contest. Brexit was the central issue around which the campaign was organised."},{"text":"The COVID-19 pandemic.","correct":false,"explanation":"The COVID-19 pandemic began affecting Britain after the December 2019 election, so it could not have been its central campaign issue. The election was dominated by Brexit."}]},{"id":"ee7c47db-e119-4414-b74b-e015b74e96aa","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"A red wall seat was a traditionally [ ] constituency vulnerable to the Conservatives.","back":"A red wall seat was a traditionally Labour constituency vulnerable to the Conservatives.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Labour","correct":true,"explanation":"The red wall referred to traditionally Labour constituencies, especially in northern England and the Midlands, whose changing political loyalties made them increasingly vulnerable to Conservative gains."},{"text":"Conservative","correct":false,"explanation":"Calling these seats Conservative reverses the concept: they were targets for Conservative gains, not traditionally Conservative constituencies. A red wall seat was traditionally Labour."},{"text":"Liberal Democrat","correct":false,"explanation":"Liberal Democrat strongholds were not what the red wall described. The term referred to traditionally Labour constituencies that had become vulnerable to Conservative advances."},{"text":"UKIP","correct":false,"explanation":"Although UKIP influenced voting patterns in some of these areas, red wall seats were not traditionally UKIP-held. They were traditionally Labour constituencies vulnerable to the Conservatives."}]},{"id":"652cc57e-8a73-4dd4-97c8-a94ece86c228","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"In 1979, how did the Winter of Discontent damage Labour?","back":"It linked Labour to strikes, union power, inflation and weak competency.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It linked Labour to strikes, union power, inflation and weak competency.","correct":true,"explanation":"The industrial unrest of 1978-79 associated Labour with disruptive strikes and excessive trade-union influence. Alongside high inflation, this reinforced perceptions that the government was economically and politically incompetent."},{"text":"It linked Labour to privatisation, weak unions, deflation and harsh competency.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Winter of Discontent did not primarily suggest excessive privatisation or weak unions. It damaged Labour by associating the party with strikes, union power, inflation and weak competency."},{"text":"It linked Labour to stability, union restraint, growth and strong competency.","correct":false,"explanation":"The unrest did not create an image of industrial stability and economic strength. It instead linked Labour to widespread strikes, powerful unions, inflation and weak competency."},{"text":"It linked Labour to war, military power, recession and weak diplomacy.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Winter of Discontent was a domestic industrial-relations crisis, not principally a foreign-policy controversy. It linked Labour to strikes, union power, inflation and weak competency."}]},{"id":"7524afbc-6d05-4415-b8cf-8d6405394dd0","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The 1979 election had a [ ] swing from Labour to Conservative.","back":"The 1979 election had a 5.2% swing from Labour to Conservative.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"5.2%","correct":true,"explanation":"The 1979 general election produced a 5.2% swing from Labour to the Conservatives. This substantial movement helped Margaret Thatcher secure a clear parliamentary victory."},{"text":"10.4%","correct":false,"explanation":"This figure is roughly double the actual swing, a likely error from adding or doubling changes in party vote shares. The Labour-to-Conservative swing was 5.2%."},{"text":"2.6%","correct":false,"explanation":"This understates the scale of voters’ movement towards the Conservatives in 1979. The recognised Labour-to-Conservative swing was 5.2%, contributing to Thatcher’s victory."},{"text":"3.0%","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses the election’s swing with a smaller change in one party’s vote share. The overall swing from Labour to Conservative was 5.2%."}]},{"id":"f9f7fd07-2c5f-46d4-9490-9c28186ec223","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which 1979 Conservative appeal attracted some skilled working-class voters?","back":"Aspiration, home ownership and union reform.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Aspiration, home ownership and union reform.","correct":true,"explanation":"Conservative promises supporting aspiration, council-house purchase and reduced trade-union power appealed to some skilled working-class voters who sought greater personal ownership and economic advancement."},{"text":"Nationalisation, public ownership and union expansion.","correct":false,"explanation":"Nationalisation and stronger trade unions were associated more closely with traditional Labour politics. Conservatives attracted some skilled workers through aspiration, home ownership and union reform."},{"text":"Higher taxation, state ownership and union protection.","correct":false,"explanation":"Higher taxation and tighter state control conflicted with the Conservatives’ emphasis on individual advancement and reduced union influence. Their appeal centred on aspiration, home ownership and union reform."},{"text":"Welfare expansion, council ownership and union support.","correct":false,"explanation":"Welfare expansion and industrial subsidies were not the distinctive Conservative appeal to skilled working-class voters. The party stressed aspiration, home ownership and union reform."}]},{"id":"7ae3530a-4308-4cc1-aba5-51992101c39c","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What mandate did Thatcher claim after the 1979 victory?","back":"A mandate for a new economic direction.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A mandate for a new economic direction.","correct":true,"explanation":"Thatcher interpreted the Conservatives’ 1979 victory as public authorisation to break with post-war economic consensus and pursue a new direction based on market-oriented policies."},{"text":"A mandate for a return to post-war consensus.","correct":false,"explanation":"Thatcher did not present her victory as approval for preserving the post-war consensus. She claimed a mandate for a new economic direction centred on market-oriented reform."},{"text":"A mandate for a new military direction.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although defence formed part of Conservative policy, Thatcher’s principal claimed mandate concerned transforming economic policy. She argued that voters had endorsed a new economic direction."},{"text":"A mandate for a new union-led direction.","correct":false,"explanation":"Further trade-union expansion contradicted Thatcher’s programme of restricting union power and changing economic management. She claimed a mandate for a new economic direction."}]},{"id":"8524e3c7-c892-4810-9b8f-400d70d021ea","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In 1997, Labour won [ ] seats.","back":"In 1997, Labour won 418 seats.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"418","correct":true,"explanation":"Labour won 418 seats in 1997, producing a landslide victory and a parliamentary majority of 179 over all other parties combined."},{"text":"419","correct":false,"explanation":"This is an off-by-one error. Labour secured 418 seats in 1997, giving Tony Blair’s party a landslide majority after 18 years of Conservative government."},{"text":"336","correct":false,"explanation":"This understates the scale of Labour’s landslide, perhaps by confusing it with a narrower majority. Labour actually won 418 seats in the 1997 election."},{"text":"356","correct":false,"explanation":"This figure significantly underestimates Labour’s 1997 result. The party won 418 seats as its broad electoral coalition delivered a decisive landslide victory."}]},{"id":"5ce1bc21-de22-43b6-b6de-cb3763f6532b","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which 1992 event damaged Conservative economic credibility before 1997?","back":"Black Wednesday.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Black Wednesday.","correct":true,"explanation":"Black Wednesday forced Britain out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, severely damaging the Conservatives’ reputation for economic competence before the 1997 election."},{"text":"The Winter of Discontent.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Winter of Discontent occurred under Labour in 1978-79 and harmed Labour’s reputation. Black Wednesday in 1992 damaged Conservative economic credibility before 1997."},{"text":"The poll tax riots.","correct":false,"explanation":"The poll tax riots damaged the Conservatives politically, but the key 1992 event undermining their economic credibility was Black Wednesday and Britain’s ERM withdrawal."},{"text":"The cash-for-questions affair.","correct":false,"explanation":"Cash-for-questions contributed to perceptions of Conservative sleaze, rather than directly undermining economic competence. Black Wednesday was the decisive 1992 economic credibility shock."}]},{"id":"ee515236-9374-4409-9ba6-abe273404eab","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In 1997, the swing was [ ] from Conservative to Labour.","back":"In 1997, the swing was 10.0% from Conservative to Labour.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"10.0%","correct":true,"explanation":"The 1997 election produced a 10.0% swing from Conservative to Labour, contributing to Labour’s landslide and the Conservatives’ heavy loss of seats."},{"text":"8.8%","correct":false,"explanation":"This understates the movement between the two main parties. The measured swing from Conservative to Labour in the 1997 general election was 10.0%."},{"text":"12.5%","correct":false,"explanation":"This overstates the electoral movement, possibly by treating separate vote-share changes as the swing. The Conservative-to-Labour swing was 10.0%."},{"text":"5.0%","correct":false,"explanation":"This may result from halving an already calculated swing rather than the combined vote-share movement. The correct Conservative-to-Labour swing was 10.0%."}]},{"id":"88a49d8d-fd49-479d-b05d-ac5f497bab63","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How did New Labour’s move to the centre affect its 1997 coalition?","back":"It helped Labour win middle-class and working-class voters.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It helped Labour win middle-class and working-class voters.","correct":true,"explanation":"New Labour’s centrist positioning retained much of its traditional working-class support while reassuring middle-class voters, helping create the broad coalition behind the 1997 landslide."},{"text":"It helped Labour win only its traditional working-class voters.","correct":false,"explanation":"This misses the breadth of New Labour’s appeal. Moving towards the centre helped Labour attract middle-class voters while also retaining substantial working-class support."},{"text":"It helped Labour win mainly rural Conservative voters.","correct":false,"explanation":"New Labour did make gains beyond its traditional base, but its coalition was not mainly rural Conservatives. It united middle-class and working-class voters."},{"text":"It helped Labour win only middle-class southern voters.","correct":false,"explanation":"This wrongly narrows Labour’s coalition to one social and regional group. New Labour’s centrist strategy appealed to both middle-class and working-class voters."}]},{"id":"c8bf35f7-9a03-45cd-8322-e041b6a07e03","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How did tactical voting help Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 1997?","back":"Voters backed the best-placed anti-Conservative candidate locally.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Voters backed the best-placed anti-Conservative candidate locally.","correct":true,"explanation":"Anti-Conservative voters sometimes supported whichever Labour or Liberal Democrat candidate had the best local chance, reducing vote splitting and helping defeat Conservative incumbents."},{"text":"Voters backed the Conservative candidate with the smallest majority locally.","correct":false,"explanation":"Tactical voting aimed to remove vulnerable Conservatives, not support them. Voters selected the best-placed anti-Conservative candidate in their constituency to avoid splitting opposition votes."},{"text":"Voters backed the same opposition party in every constituency locally.","correct":false,"explanation":"Tactical voting varied according to local electoral strength rather than following one party nationally. Voters backed the best-placed anti-Conservative candidate in each constituency."},{"text":"Voters backed the least-established anti-Conservative candidate locally.","correct":false,"explanation":"Choosing the weakest opposition candidate would split the anti-Conservative vote. Tactical voters instead supported the best-placed anti-Conservative candidate with the strongest chance of winning."}]},{"id":"11a29cf6-9b0d-427e-8906-4606032a76f3","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why was Labour’s 2019 Brexit policy harder to communicate?","back":"It proposed renegotiation followed by another referendum.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It proposed renegotiation followed by another referendum.","correct":true,"explanation":"Labour promised to renegotiate the Brexit deal and then hold another referendum, creating a multi-stage position that was harder to explain than the Conservatives’ simpler message."},{"text":"It proposed immediate withdrawal without another referendum.","correct":false,"explanation":"This resembles a clear pro-Brexit position rather than Labour’s policy. Labour proposed renegotiation followed by another referendum, making its message more complicated to communicate."},{"text":"It proposed revoking Article 50 without another referendum.","correct":false,"explanation":"Immediate revocation was associated more closely with the Liberal Democrats’ 2019 position. Labour instead proposed renegotiating the deal and then holding another referendum."},{"text":"It proposed accepting the existing deal without renegotiation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Labour did not promise simply to accept the existing Brexit deal. Its policy involved renegotiation followed by another referendum, producing a more complex message."}]},{"id":"7107fba9-aaaf-4577-9cad-799ed7d92584","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How did FPTP shape the 2019 Conservative result?","back":"It converted 43.6% vote share into an 80-seat majority.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It converted 43.6% vote share into an 80-seat majority.","correct":true,"explanation":"FPTP rewarded the Conservatives’ geographically efficient support, turning 43.6% of the national vote into enough constituency victories for an 80-seat Commons majority."},{"text":"It converted 43.6% vote share into a 43-seat majority.","correct":false,"explanation":"This incorrectly treats the vote-share figure as a guide to the majority’s size. FPTP converted 43.6% of votes into an 80-seat Conservative majority."},{"text":"It converted 50.1% vote share into an 80-seat majority.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Conservatives did not win an absolute majority of votes. Under FPTP, their 43.6% vote share was sufficient to produce an 80-seat parliamentary majority."},{"text":"It converted 43.6% vote share into a hung parliament.","correct":false,"explanation":"This overlooks how FPTP amplified the Conservative lead in constituency seats. Their 43.6% vote share produced an 80-seat majority, not a hung parliament."}]},{"id":"fcd9c1b2-8627-479a-83d8-fe9b690e759d","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"What age pattern was especially important by 2019?","back":"Younger voters leaned Labour/Lib Dem/Green; older voters leaned Conservative.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Younger voters leaned Labour/Lib Dem/Green; older voters leaned Conservative.","correct":true,"explanation":"Age became a major electoral dividing line by 2019: younger voters generally preferred progressive parties, while Conservative support was substantially stronger among older voters."},{"text":"Younger voters leaned Conservative; older voters leaned Labour/Lib Dem/Green.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the observed age divide. Younger voters tended towards Labour, the Liberal Democrats or Greens, while older voters were more likely to support the Conservatives."},{"text":"Younger voters leaned Labour/Lib Dem/Green; older voters leaned Labour.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although younger voters favoured progressive parties, older voters did not generally lean Labour. The strongest tendency among older age groups was towards the Conservatives."},{"text":"Younger voters leaned Conservative; older voters leaned Conservative.","correct":false,"explanation":"Conservative support was especially concentrated among older voters, not across both age groups. Younger voters leaned more towards Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Greens."}]},{"id":"a6329a02-44f0-4a4c-bc92-ba08f4987e2b","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Turnout fell from 76.0% in 1979 to 71.4% in 1997 and [ ] in 2019.","back":"Turnout fell from 76.0% in 1979 to 71.4% in 1997 and 67.3% in 2019.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"67.3%","correct":true,"explanation":"The 2019 UK general election turnout was 67.3%, continuing the overall decline from the higher turnout levels recorded in 1979 and 1997."},{"text":"71.4%","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses the 2019 figure with a turnout closer to that of the 1997 election. Turnout in 2019 was 67.3%, not 71.4%."},{"text":"59.4%","correct":false,"explanation":"This overstates the decline by using a figure associated with the unusually low turnouts of the early 2000s. The 2019 turnout was 67.3%."},{"text":"80.3%","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the stated downward trend by placing turnout above its 1979 level. The proportion voting in the 2019 general election was 67.3%."}]},{"id":"3fa45e25-255f-4e25-9336-94e098c6c4aa","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What is the trend when class becomes a weaker predictor of party choice?","back":"Class dealignment.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Class dealignment.","correct":true,"explanation":"Class dealignment occurs when social class becomes less useful for predicting whether someone will vote for a particular political party."},{"text":"Partisan dealignment.","correct":false,"explanation":"Partisan dealignment is the weakening of voters’ long-term loyalty to parties, rather than specifically the declining relationship between social class and party choice. The correct trend is class dealignment."},{"text":"Class alignment.","correct":false,"explanation":"Class alignment describes a strong and predictable relationship between social class and party choice. When that relationship weakens, the trend is class dealignment."},{"text":"Partisan alignment.","correct":false,"explanation":"Partisan alignment means voters maintain stable loyalty to particular parties. A weaker connection between social class and voting choice is instead called class dealignment."}]},{"id":"aa8b11cd-65f4-4e20-9503-eb16f1285945","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The weakening of long-term loyalty to a party is [ ].","back":"The weakening of long-term loyalty to a party is partisan dealignment.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"partisan dealignment","correct":true,"explanation":"Partisan dealignment is the process through which voters’ enduring identification with and loyalty to a particular political party become weaker."},{"text":"class dealignment","correct":false,"explanation":"Class dealignment concerns the weakening connection between social class and voting choice, not the erosion of long-term loyalty to a party. The correct term is partisan dealignment."},{"text":"partisan alignment","correct":false,"explanation":"Partisan alignment refers to stable or strong identification with a political party, which is the opposite of weakening long-term loyalty. The correct term is partisan dealignment."},{"text":"class alignment","correct":false,"explanation":"Class alignment describes a predictable association between social class and party support, rather than declining loyalty to one party over time. The correct term is partisan dealignment."}]},{"id":"be1c4b87-3d3f-431f-9cea-218c86658b90","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How does media agenda-setting affect voting behaviour?","back":"It makes voters judge parties through issues receiving attention.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It makes voters judge parties through issues receiving attention.","correct":true,"explanation":"Agenda-setting shapes which political matters voters regard as important, so parties are assessed largely through the issues that receive prominent media coverage."},{"text":"It makes voters support parties with the most media coverage.","correct":false,"explanation":"Agenda-setting influences which issues voters prioritise, but it does not compel everyone to support the party receiving the most coverage. Voters judge parties through issues receiving attention."},{"text":"It makes voters disregard parties on issues receiving attention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Agenda-setting increases the salience of selected issues rather than ensuring that voters ignore them. It makes voters judge parties through issues receiving attention."},{"text":"It makes voters copy journalists’ personal party preferences.","correct":false,"explanation":"Agenda-setting concerns the prominence given to issues, not the replacement of political judgement with journalists’ declared preferences. Voters judge parties through issues receiving attention."}]},{"id":"8bbad3a3-b728-4e24-bd59-0ba8304f1104","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why does social media often reinforce rather than convert voters?","back":"Voters choose media that already fits their views.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Voters choose media that already fits their views.","correct":true,"explanation":"Selective exposure leads people to follow accounts and sources compatible with their existing beliefs, so social media commonly strengthens prior political attitudes rather than changing them."},{"text":"Voters choose media that directly opposes their views.","correct":false,"explanation":"Voters commonly select congenial sources rather than deliberately seeking content that contradicts their beliefs. Social media therefore reinforces views because voters choose media that already fits them."},{"text":"Voters choose media with no relation to their views.","correct":false,"explanation":"Social media use is not politically random because algorithms and personal choices often filter what users encounter. Reinforcement occurs when voters choose media that already fits their views."},{"text":"Voters choose media that always challenges their views.","correct":false,"explanation":"Choosing only unfamiliar political positions would create greater potential for conversion, not reinforcement. Social media reinforces attitudes because voters choose media that already fits their views."}]},{"id":"bdd63009-88c0-4730-9a20-db93a6d8d3f5","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can opinion polls encourage tactical voting?","back":"They signal which challenger can defeat the local front-runner.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They signal which challenger can defeat the local front-runner.","correct":true,"explanation":"Local polling can identify the best-placed rival to the leading candidate, allowing voters to support that challenger strategically rather than vote for their first preference."},{"text":"They signal which front-runner can defeat every local challenger.","correct":false,"explanation":"Tactical voters are not necessarily trying to strengthen the candidate already leading. Polls help by signalling which challenger can defeat the local front-runner."},{"text":"They signal which national party can win the largest vote share.","correct":false,"explanation":"National popularity does not necessarily reveal which candidate is best placed in a particular constituency. Polls encourage tactical voting by identifying a challenger who can defeat the local front-runner."},{"text":"They signal which challenger will lose to the local front-runner.","correct":false,"explanation":"A challenger who cannot overtake the leader offers little tactical value. Polls matter because they signal which challenger can defeat the local front-runner."}]},{"id":"6cf1c650-84a8-43a6-8b05-5f2000397ae9","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why are campaign polls not election results?","back":"They depend on sampling, weighting, turnout assumptions and timing.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They depend on sampling, weighting, turnout assumptions and timing.","correct":true,"explanation":"Campaign polls estimate support from a sample rather than counting ballots, and their findings vary with statistical adjustments, expected participation and when fieldwork occurs."},{"text":"They record every voter’s final choice without statistical adjustment.","correct":false,"explanation":"Campaign polls do not record every voter’s final ballot and inevitably require statistical estimation. They depend on sampling, weighting, turnout assumptions and timing."},{"text":"They include only voters whose ballots have already been counted.","correct":false,"explanation":"Campaign polls are conducted before voting is complete and do not use counted ballots as their respondent pool. They depend on sampling, weighting, turnout assumptions and timing."},{"text":"They use official ballot totals released before polling day.","correct":false,"explanation":"Official ballot totals do not exist before polling day, so campaign polls cannot use them as results. They depend on sampling, weighting, turnout assumptions and timing."}]},{"id":"50c5d691-107e-44d5-be9f-30c9a3df4a60","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why are exit polls usually more reliable than campaign polls?","back":"They survey voters after they have voted.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They survey voters after they have voted.","correct":true,"explanation":"Exit polls question people immediately after voting, so they measure reported behaviour rather than asking respondents to predict what they may do later."},{"text":"They survey voters before the campaign has started.","correct":false,"explanation":"Surveys conducted before a campaign begins cannot capture late decisions or actual voting behaviour. Exit polls are generally stronger because they survey voters after they have voted."},{"text":"They survey voters before they enter polling stations.","correct":false,"explanation":"Questioning people before they vote still measures intention, which may change or fail to translate into turnout. Exit polls survey voters after they have voted."},{"text":"They survey voters after every result is declared.","correct":false,"explanation":"Exit polls are conducted outside selected polling stations, not after all official results are known. Their reliability comes from surveying voters after they have voted."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-12","paperLabel":"Paper 1"},"heading":"Voting behaviour and the media","title":"Voting behaviour and the media Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/as-level/politics/edexcel/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L38"}]}],"topicId":"10c69770-60b5-5871-bc3a-780d985cf2aa","walled":"$L39"}],"$L3a","$L3b"]