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The branch responsible for daily government is the executive."},{"text":"Judiciary.","correct":false,"explanation":"The judiciary interprets and applies the law through the courts rather than managing government policy. Day-to-day administration is performed by the executive."},{"text":"Monarchy.","correct":false,"explanation":"The monarchy performs constitutional and ceremonial functions but does not ordinarily manage the country day to day. That responsibility belongs to the executive."}]},{"id":"f6116c26-4d54-4592-878e-b8e3cbaef2f8","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Why is the Prime Minister appointed by the monarch?","back":"They are most likely to command Commons confidence.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They are most likely to command Commons confidence.","correct":true,"explanation":"The monarch appoints the person best placed to retain the confidence of the House of Commons, normally the leader of the largest governing party."},{"text":"They are directly elected by the whole electorate.","correct":false,"explanation":"Prime ministers are not directly elected to that office by the whole electorate. The monarch appoints whoever is most likely to command Commons confidence."},{"text":"They are most likely to command Lords confidence.","correct":false,"explanation":"Winning the confidence of the House of Lords does not determine who becomes Prime Minister. The decisive requirement is the ability to command Commons confidence."},{"text":"They are personally chosen by the reigning monarch.","correct":false,"explanation":"The monarch does not select a Prime Minister according to personal preference. Constitutional convention requires appointing the person most likely to command Commons confidence."}]},{"id":"c1094f58-60b4-4a43-90e8-fea0eb62dba6","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Government departments are led by [ ] but run day to day by [ ].","back":"Government departments are led by ministers but run day to day by civil servants.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Government departments are led by ministers but run day to day by civil servants.","correct":true,"explanation":"Ministers provide political leadership, determine policy and remain accountable to Parliament. Permanent, politically neutral civil servants administer departments and implement policy on a day-to-day basis."},{"text":"Government departments are led by civil servants but run day to day by ministers.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the roles: ministers give departments political direction, while permanent civil servants handle their day-to-day administration and support policy implementation."},{"text":"Government departments are led by special advisers but run day to day by backbench MPs.","correct":false,"explanation":"Special advisers offer partisan political advice but do not formally lead departments, while MPs outside government do not administer them. Ministers lead departments and civil servants run them daily."},{"text":"Government departments are led by select committees but run day to day by members of the Lords.","correct":false,"explanation":"Select committees scrutinise government departments, and peers participate in Parliament; neither group manages departments. Ministers provide leadership, while civil servants conduct daily administration."}]},{"id":"3c3def29-ac44-4572-a726-41d3a64b1627","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why do most successful Acts of Parliament begin as government bills?","back":"

Government controls much of the Commons timetable.
Government usually has a majority or working arrangement.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Government controls much of the Commons timetable.
Government usually has a majority or working arrangement.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Government controls substantial parliamentary time and can normally mobilise enough MPs to win divisions. These advantages make government bills much more likely to complete the legislative process."},{"text":"

Opposition controls much of the Commons timetable.
Opposition usually has a majority or working arrangement.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Opposition parties receive only limited parliamentary time and cannot normally guarantee government support. Government bills succeed because ministers control much of the timetable and usually command enough Commons votes."},{"text":"

Government bills bypass all parliamentary scrutiny.
Government bills require only Cabinet approval.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Government bills still undergo parliamentary stages and require approval beyond the Cabinet. Their advantage instead comes from government control of Commons time and reliable voting support."},{"text":"

The monarch controls much of the Commons timetable.
Government always has a majority in the Lords.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The monarch does not allocate Commons business, and governments do not permanently control the Lords. Success mainly reflects control of Commons time and sufficient support among MPs."}]},{"id":"6b68ca32-722c-4179-8dac-6b39d9aac70a","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which Cabinet minister presents taxation and spending plans?","back":"Chancellor of the Exchequer.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Chancellor of the Exchequer.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Chancellor of the Exchequer leads the Treasury and sets out the government’s taxation and spending plans, most notably through the Budget and spending reviews."},{"text":"Secretary of State for the Home Department.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Home Secretary is responsible principally for policing, immigration and domestic security. Taxation and spending plans are presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer."},{"text":"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Foreign Secretary oversees foreign policy and diplomatic relations rather than public finances. The Chancellor of the Exchequer presents the government’s taxation and spending plans."},{"text":"Leader of the House of Commons.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Leader of the House manages government business in the Commons rather than Treasury policy. Taxation and spending plans are presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer."}]},{"id":"c9e93fd7-c0cc-4144-9866-06d62e47f5b3","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to [ ] but are exercised in practice by [ ].","back":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to the Crown but are exercised in practice by ministers.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to the Crown but are exercised in practice by ministers.","correct":true,"explanation":"Prerogative powers formally remain powers of the Crown, but constitutional convention means that ministers, especially the Prime Minister, normally decide how they are exercised."},{"text":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to Parliament but are exercised in practice by ministers.","correct":false,"explanation":"Parliament can regulate or replace prerogative powers by statute, but those powers legally originate in the Crown. In modern practice, ministers exercise them."},{"text":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to the Crown but are exercised in practice by civil servants.","correct":false,"explanation":"Civil servants may advise and implement decisions, but they do not personally exercise prerogative powers. Those powers belong legally to the Crown and are used by ministers."},{"text":"Royal prerogative powers legally belong to the Prime Minister but are exercised in practice by the monarch.","correct":false,"explanation":"Prerogative powers do not legally belong to the Prime Minister, and the monarch generally does not exercise them personally. They belong to the Crown but are used by ministers."}]},{"id":"68a3740f-a951-45ca-a1df-8ec3bf519a39","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing [ ], often through [ ].","back":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing Act of Parliament, often through statutory instruments.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing Act of Parliament, often through statutory instruments.","correct":true,"explanation":"An enabling Act delegates law-making authority to ministers and defines its limits. Ministers commonly exercise that authority by issuing statutory instruments."},{"text":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing court judgment, often through statutory instruments.","correct":false,"explanation":"A court judgment may interpret legislation but does not normally delegate legislative authority to ministers. Secondary legislation must derive from an Act of Parliament, usually through statutory instruments."},{"text":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing Act of Parliament, often through private members’ bills.","correct":false,"explanation":"Private members’ bills are proposals for primary legislation, not instruments through which ministers exercise delegated powers. Secondary legislation is commonly made through statutory instruments authorised by an Act."},{"text":"Secondary legislation is made by ministers under an existing Ministerial Code, often through select committee reports.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Ministerial Code regulates ministerial conduct and select committee reports scrutinise policy; neither authorises delegated law-making. An Act of Parliament provides authority, commonly exercised through statutory instruments."}]},{"id":"584cfe27-c868-42f8-8af3-0ed283628688","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"A minister changes quarantine rules using powers in a Public Health Act. What type of power is this?","back":"Secondary legislation - authority comes from an Act of Parliament.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Secondary legislation - authority comes from an Act of Parliament.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Public Health Act supplies delegated authority allowing a minister to alter detailed rules without passing a new Act. This is an exercise of secondary legislation."},{"text":"Primary legislation - authority comes directly from the royal prerogative.","correct":false,"explanation":"Primary legislation is an Act passed through Parliament itself. Rules made by a minister using authority delegated by an existing Act are secondary legislation."},{"text":"Royal prerogative - authority comes from the historic powers of the Crown.","correct":false,"explanation":"A royal prerogative power derives from the Crown’s residual common-law authority, not from a Public Health Act. Statutory ministerial rule-making is secondary legislation."},{"text":"Constitutional convention - authority comes from established political practice.","correct":false,"explanation":"A constitutional convention is a non-legal rule governing political behaviour, not a statutory power to change quarantine law. Authority delegated by an Act produces secondary legislation."}]},{"id":"514a7cb5-4eca-4601-91bd-9de81ac534fd","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What limit did Miller 2017 place on Article 50 prerogative power?","back":"Ministers needed Parliament's authorisation because statutory rights would be removed.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Ministers needed Parliament's authorisation because statutory rights would be removed.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Supreme Court held that ministers could not use prerogative power to trigger Article 50 when doing so would remove statutory rights created by Parliament."},{"text":"Ministers needed the monarch's authorisation because statutory rights would be removed.","correct":false,"explanation":"Royal assent completes the enactment of legislation but was not the constitutional limit identified in Miller. Parliament had to authorise the removal of statutory rights."},{"text":"Ministers needed the electorate's authorisation because statutory rights would be removed.","correct":false,"explanation":"The referendum produced a political mandate but did not legally authorise ministers to remove rights established by statute. The necessary authorisation had to come from Parliament."},{"text":"Ministers needed the Cabinet's authorisation because statutory rights would be removed.","correct":false,"explanation":"Cabinet approval cannot override or alter statutory rights. Miller established that Parliament, rather than the executive acting alone, had to authorise the triggering of Article 50."}]},{"id":"b8eb3ad4-468f-47ec-9896-559e8f81dcb0","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why was prorogation unlawful in Miller/Cherry 2019?","back":"It frustrated Parliament's scrutiny without reasonable justification.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It frustrated Parliament's scrutiny without reasonable justification.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Supreme Court ruled that prorogation unlawfully prevented Parliament from scrutinising the executive at a constitutionally important time, and the government provided no reasonable justification."},{"text":"It delayed the government's legislation without reasonable justification.","correct":false,"explanation":"Prorogation did not become unlawful merely because it delayed government legislation. Its unlawfulness arose because it frustrated Parliament's constitutional scrutiny without reasonable justification."},{"text":"It ignored the opposition's consent without reasonable justification.","correct":false,"explanation":"The case did not establish a requirement for the opposition to consent to prorogation. The decisive problem was its unjustified effect on Parliament's ability to scrutinise government."},{"text":"It bypassed the monarch's approval without reasonable justification.","correct":false,"explanation":"The monarch acts on ministerial advice when proroguing Parliament, so the absence of independent royal approval was not the issue. The prorogation unjustifiably frustrated parliamentary scrutiny."}]},{"id":"cef5f5d0-c81f-4f1e-8629-e46891576a93","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"A minister is challenged over personal misconduct or departmental failure. Which convention applies?","back":"Individual ministerial responsibility.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Individual ministerial responsibility.","correct":true,"explanation":"Individual ministerial responsibility concerns a minister's own conduct and accountability for their department, including answering to Parliament and potentially resigning for serious failures."},{"text":"Collective ministerial responsibility.","correct":false,"explanation":"Collective responsibility governs Cabinet solidarity over agreed government policy, not accountability for a particular minister's personal misconduct or the performance of their department."},{"text":"The Salisbury convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Salisbury convention concerns the House of Lords normally accepting manifesto legislation. Personal misconduct and departmental failure instead engage individual ministerial responsibility."},{"text":"The Sewell convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Sewell convention concerns Westminster normally seeking consent before legislating on devolved matters. A minister's personal conduct or departmental performance engages individual ministerial responsibility."}]},{"id":"801f62a8-a6a0-46a3-a3f6-ec5e1b8be39e","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"When is resignation under individual ministerial responsibility most likely?","back":"

Personal fault by the minister.
Misleading Parliament.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Personal fault by the minister.
Misleading Parliament.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Resignation is most likely where the minister is personally culpable, particularly for misconduct or knowingly misleading Parliament, rather than merely because officials made an operational error."},{"text":"

Policy disagreement by the minister.
Falling poll ratings.

","correct":false,"explanation":"A policy disagreement and declining popularity do not automatically require resignation under individual responsibility. Resignation is likelier when the minister is personally at fault or misleads Parliament."},{"text":"

Civil service error by officials.
Negative press coverage.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Routine civil service mistakes and hostile media coverage rarely establish personal ministerial culpability. Resignation becomes more likely with personal fault or misleading statements to Parliament."},{"text":"

Cabinet disagreement by the minister.
Facing parliamentary questions.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Cabinet debate and parliamentary questioning are normal features of accountable government, not usual grounds for resignation. Personal fault and misleading Parliament create a much stronger expectation."}]},{"id":"4dc02d77-e820-46b3-9359-c1cf87e1e8fd","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support [ ] or [ ].","back":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support agreed government policy or resign.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support agreed government policy or resign.","correct":true,"explanation":"Collective responsibility requires ministers to present a united public position behind policy agreed by the government. A minister unable to do so is conventionally expected to resign."},{"text":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support personal policy preferences or resign.","correct":false,"explanation":"Ministers are not free to prioritise personal policy preferences while remaining in government. They must publicly support agreed government policy or resign from ministerial office."},{"text":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support agreed government policy or publicly dissent.","correct":false,"explanation":"Public dissent is incompatible with collective responsibility unless the convention has formally been suspended. Ministers must support agreed government policy publicly or resign."},{"text":"Under collective ministerial responsibility, ministers must publicly support Cabinet discussions or abstain.","correct":false,"explanation":"Collective responsibility does not require ministers to support confidential Cabinet discussions, nor does abstention normally resolve public disagreement. They must support agreed policy or resign."}]},{"id":"88f2b448-eb7c-4b06-8c20-9c731ed72081","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"A Cabinet minister publicly attacks agreed government policy. Which convention is breached?","back":"Collective ministerial responsibility.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Collective ministerial responsibility.","correct":true,"explanation":"Collective ministerial responsibility requires Cabinet ministers to defend agreed government policy in public. A minister who cannot maintain that solidarity is normally expected to resign."},{"text":"Individual ministerial responsibility.","correct":false,"explanation":"Individual responsibility concerns a minister's personal conduct and departmental accountability, not public unity over Cabinet decisions. Attacking agreed policy breaches collective ministerial responsibility."},{"text":"The Salisbury convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Salisbury convention concerns the House of Lords' treatment of manifesto commitments. Publicly opposing agreed government policy instead violates collective ministerial responsibility."},{"text":"The Sewell convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Sewell convention regulates Westminster legislation in devolved areas and is unrelated to Cabinet unity. A minister's public attack on agreed policy breaches collective responsibility."}]},{"id":"125bf5ea-c616-420a-8082-850809a85e61","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How does patronage give a Prime Minister leverage over ministers?","back":"The PM can appoint or dismiss ministers, encouraging loyalty.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The PM can appoint or dismiss ministers, encouraging loyalty.","correct":true,"explanation":"Control over ministerial careers gives the Prime Minister a powerful reward and sanction. Ministers have an incentive to remain loyal to gain promotion or avoid dismissal."},{"text":"The PM can appoint or dismiss judges, encouraging loyalty.","correct":false,"explanation":"Judges are appointed through processes designed to protect judicial independence, not used as instruments of Cabinet discipline. Prime-ministerial leverage comes from appointing or dismissing ministers."},{"text":"The PM can appoint or dismiss MPs, encouraging loyalty.","correct":false,"explanation":"MPs are elected by constituents and cannot simply be dismissed by the Prime Minister. Patronage creates leverage through control over appointments to and dismissals from ministerial office."},{"text":"The PM can appoint or dismiss civil servants, encouraging loyalty.","correct":false,"explanation":"Civil servants are politically impartial and are not ministerial patronage appointments used to enforce Cabinet loyalty. The Prime Minister's leverage concerns appointing and dismissing ministers."}]},{"id":"2c0f1b25-e2ef-4f11-a88c-cdbc76389171","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the [ ] controls [ ].","back":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the Treasury controls spending.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the Treasury controls spending.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Chancellor leads the Treasury, which oversees public expenditure and departmental budgets. This financial control can restrict the policies and priorities a Prime Minister can pursue."},{"text":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the Cabinet Office controls spending.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Cabinet Office supports central coordination but does not exercise the Treasury's central control over public expenditure. Chancellors gain leverage because the Treasury controls spending."},{"text":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the Treasury controls appointments.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Treasury's main source of leverage over prime ministers is financial control, not control of ministerial appointments. Patronage appointments are primarily exercised by the Prime Minister."},{"text":"Chancellors can constrain Prime Ministers because the Parliament controls taxation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although Parliament authorises taxation through legislation, this does not explain the Chancellor's institutional leverage. That leverage comes from the Treasury's control of government spending."}]},{"id":"429e97db-9aa0-4de3-a468-1242f5648854","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"What political conditions help a Prime Minister dominate Cabinet?","back":"

Large majority.
Strong public approval.
United party.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Large majority.
Strong public approval.
United party.

","correct":true,"explanation":"A large Commons majority, high public approval and party unity give the Prime Minister authority over ministers, reducing the risk of Cabinet resistance or parliamentary defeat."},{"text":"

Small majority.
Weak public approval.
Divided party.

","correct":false,"explanation":"These conditions make Cabinet domination less likely because parliamentary vulnerability, unpopular leadership and internal division encourage ministers and backbenchers to challenge the Prime Minister. The stronger combination is a large majority, strong public approval and a united party."},{"text":"

Large majority.
Weak public approval.
Divided party.

","correct":false,"explanation":"A large majority can help, but weak public approval and party division undermine authority by increasing pressure from ministers and MPs. Cabinet dominance is associated with strong approval and a united party as well."},{"text":"

Small majority.
Strong public approval.
United party.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Public approval and party unity are helpful, but a small majority leaves the government more vulnerable to parliamentary defeats and rebellions. A large majority is the relevant condition for maximum Cabinet control."}]},{"id":"e7370414-008c-4f3c-8fe9-1ee14061d94a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What parliamentary result weakened Theresa May after 2017?","back":"She lost the Conservative majority and relied on the DUP.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"She lost the Conservative majority and relied on the DUP.","correct":true,"explanation":"The 2017 election left the Conservatives without an overall Commons majority, so May needed a confidence-and-supply agreement with the DUP, weakening her authority and negotiating position."},{"text":"She increased the Conservative majority and relied on the DUP.","correct":false,"explanation":"The election was intended to strengthen May but instead removed her majority. She therefore relied on the DUP; claiming that the Conservative majority increased reverses the actual result."},{"text":"She lost the Conservative majority and relied on the SNP.","correct":false,"explanation":"May did lose the Conservative majority, but the supporting party was the Democratic Unionist Party, not the SNP. The SNP was a separate opposition party and did not sustain her government."},{"text":"She kept the Conservative majority and relied on the DUP.","correct":false,"explanation":"The DUP arrangement was necessary precisely because the Conservatives no longer held an overall majority. Saying that May kept her majority misses the central parliamentary consequence of the 2017 election."}]},{"id":"534a063d-5645-4765-8e9f-7de3cecaec3e","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as [ ] rather than [ ].","back":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as first among equals rather than a personal ruler.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as first among equals rather than a personal ruler.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Cabinet government model presents the Prime Minister as chairing a collective body of senior ministers, rather than exercising unchecked personal authority over all government decisions."},{"text":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as a personal ruler rather than first among equals.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the distinction between Cabinet and presidential-style leadership. Cabinet government emphasises collective decision-making, so the Prime Minister is seen as first among equals rather than a personal ruler."},{"text":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as the chief executive rather than a personal ruler.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although the Prime Minister leads the executive, this wording does not express the defining Cabinet-government contrast. The model stresses collective ministerial authority, with the Prime Minister first among equals rather than a personal ruler."},{"text":"Cabinet government treats the Prime Minister as first among equals rather than the Cabinet’s spokesperson.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Cabinet-government model contrasts collective leadership with personal rule, not with merely acting as the Cabinet’s spokesperson. The relevant second term is a personal ruler, which describes concentrated individual authority."}]},{"id":"916a5872-9e2e-4001-8a15-6a78595bb3e1","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"In UK politics, why is presidential government not literal?","back":"The PM still depends on Commons confidence and party support.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The PM still depends on Commons confidence and party support.","correct":true,"explanation":"Unlike a directly elected president, a UK Prime Minister must retain the confidence of the House of Commons and support from their parliamentary party to remain in office."},{"text":"The PM still depends on the monarch’s confidence and public approval.","correct":false,"explanation":"The monarch formally appoints the Prime Minister but does not normally determine whether they remain in office. The decisive constraints are Commons confidence and continuing party support."},{"text":"The PM still depends on the Lords’ confidence and Cabinet support.","correct":false,"explanation":"The House of Lords cannot normally remove a government through a confidence vote, and Cabinet support alone is insufficient. A Prime Minister needs Commons confidence and party support."},{"text":"The PM still depends on direct election and presidential powers.","correct":false,"explanation":"UK Prime Ministers are not directly elected as presidents and do not possess an independent presidential mandate. Their authority depends on Commons confidence and support from their party."}]},{"id":"93f6337a-90e7-40a3-9da2-4fee4efead86","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which 1982 event strengthened Thatcher's authority?","back":"The Falklands War.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The Falklands War.","correct":true,"explanation":"Victory in the 1982 Falklands War increased public support for Thatcher and strengthened her political authority, helping her government project decisive leadership."},{"text":"The miners’ strike.","correct":false,"explanation":"The miners’ strike occurred in 1984-85, not 1982, and its significance was linked to industrial conflict and Thatcher’s economic politics. The event that immediately strengthened her authority was the Falklands War."},{"text":"The Westland affair.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Westland affair took place in 1985-86 and damaged Thatcher’s reputation for a period. The 1982 event associated with stronger authority and increased popularity was the Falklands War."},{"text":"The poll tax protests.","correct":false,"explanation":"The poll tax protests occurred at the end of the 1980s and contributed to opposition against Thatcher. They did not strengthen her authority in 1982; that effect followed the Falklands War."}]},{"id":"487572cd-2b63-4cfa-80af-fe24d3707bbe","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What did Thatcher's resignation show about Prime Ministerial power?","back":"Cabinet colleagues and party MPs can remove a dominant PM.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Cabinet colleagues and party MPs can remove a dominant PM.","correct":true,"explanation":"Thatcher’s resignation showed that even a powerful Prime Minister depends on continued support from Cabinet ministers and Conservative MPs, who can force a leadership change through party pressure."},{"text":"Voters and the monarch can remove a dominant PM.","correct":false,"explanation":"Neither voters nor the monarch directly removed Thatcher during the crisis. Her resignation followed the loss of support among Cabinet colleagues and Conservative MPs, who made continued leadership untenable."},{"text":"The House of Lords and civil servants can remove a dominant PM.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Lords and civil servants do not normally possess the party mechanisms needed to remove a Prime Minister. Thatcher was brought down by Cabinet colleagues and Conservative MPs."},{"text":"Opposition MPs and judges can remove a dominant PM.","correct":false,"explanation":"Opposition MPs and judges may criticise or constrain a government, but they did not determine Thatcher’s departure. The decisive pressure came from her own Cabinet colleagues and party MPs."}]},{"id":"d36e831d-cca9-4290-bec8-708b940e6f1f","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Blair's [ ] meant informal No. 10-led decision-making rather than full [ ].","back":"Blair's sofa government meant informal No. 10-led decision-making rather than full Cabinet debate.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Blair's sofa government meant informal No. 10-led decision-making rather than full Cabinet debate.","correct":true,"explanation":"‘Sofa government’ describes Blair’s informal decision-making among advisers and trusted ministers in No. 10, contrasting with decisions being fully discussed and collectively scrutinised by Cabinet."},{"text":"Blair's sofa government meant informal No. 10-led decision-making rather than full parliamentary scrutiny.","correct":false,"explanation":"The first term is accurate, but the contrast concerns the Cabinet’s collective discussion, not scrutiny by Parliament. The phrase refers to informal No. 10 decision-making replacing full Cabinet debate."},{"text":"Blair's Cabinet government meant informal No. 10-led decision-making rather than full Cabinet debate.","correct":false,"explanation":"Cabinet government refers to collective ministerial decision-making, so it cannot describe Blair’s informal No. 10-centred style. The relevant term is sofa government, contrasted with full Cabinet debate."},{"text":"Blair's sofa government meant formal Cabinet-led decision-making rather than full Cabinet debate.","correct":false,"explanation":"Sofa government was informal and centred on No. 10, not formal and Cabinet-led. It describes a movement away from full Cabinet debate, so changing the decision-making style makes this sentence inaccurate."}]},{"id":"f003ad3a-132d-4911-9203-bf8d38ffe3af","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How did Gordon Brown constrain Blair?","back":"As Chancellor, Brown limited Blair's domestic policy and succession.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"As Chancellor, Brown limited Blair's domestic policy and succession.","correct":true,"explanation":"Brown controlled the Treasury and exercised influence over domestic policy, while the Blair-Brown relationship was shaped by an understood future succession arrangement that constrained Blair’s position."},{"text":"As Chancellor, Brown limited Blair's foreign policy and parliamentary majority.","correct":false,"explanation":"Brown’s main leverage came from control of domestic spending and the succession issue, not from directing foreign policy or reducing the government’s parliamentary majority. Those are different constraints."},{"text":"As Chancellor, Brown limited Blair's economic policy and Cabinet appointments.","correct":false,"explanation":"As Chancellor, Brown influenced economic matters rather than limiting Blair’s economic policy in this sense, and he did not primarily constrain Blair through Cabinet appointments. The key areas were domestic policy and succession."},{"text":"As Chancellor, Brown limited Blair's defence policy and electoral strategy.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Blair-Brown tensions were chiefly about domestic policy and who would eventually lead the Labour Party. Defence policy and electoral strategy were not the central constraints identified here."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-12","paperLabel":"Paper 1"},"heading":"Prime Minister and executive","title":"Prime Minister and executive Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/as-level/politics/edexcel/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L37"}]}],"topicId":"7a814031-5a57-5f69-8617-fe7493359bbe","walled":"$L38"}],"$L39","$L3a"]