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investigates the meaning and status of moral language. It asks what the word “wrong” expresses rather than deciding whether a particular action is morally acceptable."},{"text":"Whether "murder" should be punished.","correct":false,"explanation":"Questions about punishment concern normative or applied ethics rather than the meaning of moral language. Meta-ethics focuses on what “wrong” means when making the moral claim."},{"text":"Why "murder" causes suffering.","correct":false,"explanation":"Examining murder’s harmful effects is an applied ethical consideration, not a question about moral language itself. Meta-ethics asks what the word “wrong” means."},{"text":"Whether "murder" is always illegal.","correct":false,"explanation":"Legality concerns the content and application of law, which is distinct from meta-ethics. The meta-ethical focus is the meaning of “wrong” in the statement."}]},{"id":"9de4b927-dbd0-4add-8038-060d63c8c225","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Normative ethics asks [ ]; meta-ethics asks what moral words mean.","back":"Normative ethics asks what should I do?; meta-ethics asks what moral words mean.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"what should I do?","correct":true,"explanation":"Normative ethics identifies standards for conduct and asks which actions people ought to perform. It therefore addresses the practical question “what should I do?”"},{"text":"what do moral words mean?","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses normative ethics with meta-ethics, which analyses the meaning and status of moral language. Normative ethics instead asks “what should I do?”"},{"text":"why do moral beliefs differ?","correct":false,"explanation":"Investigating why beliefs vary is primarily descriptive ethics or moral psychology. Normative ethics evaluates how a person ought to act, asking “what should I do?”"},{"text":"how do people behave?","correct":false,"explanation":"Describing actual behaviour belongs to descriptive ethics or the social sciences. Normative ethics is prescriptive, so it asks “what should I do?” rather than what people currently do."}]},{"id":"83d84142-4d25-459f-aee7-2e7ea4c079d1","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which meta-ethical approach says "right" means what God commands?","back":"Divine Command Theory.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Divine Command Theory.","correct":true,"explanation":"Divine Command Theory defines morally right actions through God’s commands: an action is right because God commands it and wrong because God forbids it."},{"text":"Natural Law Theory.","correct":false,"explanation":"Natural Law Theory grounds morality in human nature, reason and natural purposes, not simply in commands. The approach defining right as what God commands is Divine Command Theory."},{"text":"Ethical Egoism.","correct":false,"explanation":"Ethical Egoism identifies right action with promoting one’s own self-interest. Divine Command Theory, by contrast, defines right action as whatever God commands."},{"text":"Act Utilitarianism.","correct":false,"explanation":"Act Utilitarianism judges actions by whether they maximise overall happiness, rather than by divine commands. The approach described is Divine Command Theory."}]},{"id":"8797c71c-cb02-4230-a4ce-48bf16b000e4","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In Divine Command Theory, an action is wrong because [ ].","back":"In Divine Command Theory, an action is wrong because God forbids it.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"God forbids it","correct":true,"explanation":"Divine Command Theory makes God’s commands the basis of moral status. An action is therefore wrong because God forbids it, rather than for an independent moral reason."},{"text":"God permits it","correct":false,"explanation":"Permission would mean that God allows the action, so it could not explain its wrongness within this theory. Divine Command Theory says it is wrong because God forbids it."},{"text":"society forbids it","correct":false,"explanation":"This substitutes social convention for divine authority, turning the view into a form of cultural relativism. Divine Command Theory says an action is wrong because God forbids it."},{"text":"it causes suffering","correct":false,"explanation":"Judging wrongness by harmful consequences resembles consequentialism rather than Divine Command Theory. Under Divine Command Theory, an action is wrong because God forbids it."}]},{"id":"4ed75145-9634-4962-ab90-df4597fe1652","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why can Divine Command Theory make morality objective?","back":"Moral rules are grounded in God, not preference or convention.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Moral rules are grounded in God, not preference or convention.","correct":true,"explanation":"Grounding morality in an unchanging divine authority makes its rules independent of individual tastes and social customs. This allows believers to regard morality as objective."},{"text":"Moral rules are grounded in society, not preference or convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Basing rules on society makes morality dependent on collective conventions, which may vary between cultures. Divine Command Theory claims objectivity by grounding moral rules in God."},{"text":"Moral rules are grounded in emotion, not preference or convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Emotions are personal responses and can differ between individuals, so they cannot provide the claimed objective foundation. Divine Command Theory instead grounds moral rules in God."},{"text":"Moral rules are grounded in consequences, not preference or convention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Basing morality on consequences describes a consequentialist approach and does not explain Divine Command Theory’s objectivity. This theory grounds moral rules in God rather than human preference."}]},{"id":"bd99556b-e91d-4039-8aaf-cfdf05167b99","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why can Divine Command Theory motivate believers to obey?","back":"God’s commands make duties feel binding and sacred.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"God’s commands make duties feel binding and sacred.","correct":true,"explanation":"Believers regard God as possessing supreme authority, so divine commands carry obligatory and sacred force. This can provide a powerful reason to fulfil moral duties."},{"text":"God’s commands make duties feel optional and sacred.","correct":false,"explanation":"Optional duties would not create a strong obligation to obey, despite their sacred source. Divine commands motivate believers because they make duties feel binding and sacred."},{"text":"God’s commands make duties feel flexible and personal.","correct":false,"explanation":"Treating duties as flexible and personal weakens their authority and resembles subjective morality. Divine Command Theory motivates believers by presenting duties as binding and sacred."},{"text":"God’s commands make duties feel relative and temporary.","correct":false,"explanation":"Relative and temporary rules would depend on circumstances rather than God’s enduring authority. Believers may obey because divine commands make duties feel binding and sacred."}]},{"id":"f78ffa3d-3ee9-4283-a205-d243252b11bf","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What is the Euthyphro dilemma’s central question?","back":"Is good based on God’s command, or does God command what is good?","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Is good based on God’s command, or does God command what is good?","correct":true,"explanation":"The Euthyphro dilemma asks whether divine commands create moral goodness or whether God recognises and commands goodness that already exists independently."},{"text":"Is good based on human reason, or does God command what is popular?","correct":false,"explanation":"This introduces reason and popularity, neither of which forms the classic dilemma. Euthyphro contrasts goodness created by God’s command with goodness independently recognised by God."},{"text":"Is good based on social convention, or does society command what is legal?","correct":false,"explanation":"This concerns cultural rules and law rather than the relationship between God and goodness. Euthyphro asks whether God’s command creates goodness or responds to what is already good."},{"text":"Is good based on natural consequences, or does God command what is useful?","correct":false,"explanation":"This replaces the dilemma with consequentialist ideas about usefulness and outcomes. The real question is whether God’s commands create goodness or track an independent standard of goodness."}]},{"id":"3da71c9e-ac29-4d56-b80f-7e0f25fb7cf5","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"If God’s command creates goodness, what Euthyphro problem follows?","back":"Morality may seem arbitrary.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Morality may seem arbitrary.","correct":true,"explanation":"If God’s command alone creates goodness, there appears to be no independent moral reason behind the command. Morality could therefore seem dependent on God’s unrestricted choice."},{"text":"Morality may seem independent of God.","correct":false,"explanation":"Independence from God is the concern raised by the dilemma’s other horn, where God commands actions because they are already good. Here, morality may instead seem arbitrary."},{"text":"Morality may seem based on human reason.","correct":false,"explanation":"This would ground moral truth in rational judgement rather than divine choice. If God’s commands create goodness, the Euthyphro concern is that morality may seem arbitrary."},{"text":"Morality may seem fixed above God.","correct":false,"explanation":"A moral standard above God follows from claiming that God commands what is independently good. If divine commands create goodness, the relevant problem is arbitrariness instead."}]},{"id":"a78bcba6-944f-4021-a6e5-cf04da939467","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"If God commands actions because they are already good, what problem follows?","back":"Goodness seems independent of God.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Goodness seems independent of God.","correct":true,"explanation":"If God commands actions because they are already good, their goodness exists prior to and separately from his commands, apparently limiting God’s role as morality’s foundation."},{"text":"Goodness becomes whatever God commands.","correct":false,"explanation":"This describes the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, where commands create goodness. Here, God recognises existing goodness, so goodness seems independent of God."},{"text":"Goodness seems impossible to understand.","correct":false,"explanation":"The issue is not whether humans can understand goodness. If actions are good before God commands them, goodness seems independent of God rather than grounded in his will."},{"text":"Goodness depends entirely upon God.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the relationship stated in the question. If God commands actions because they are already good, their goodness does not depend entirely upon God."}]},{"id":"a1ad9bae-ee1b-4684-a23f-4fa819917055","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why is knowing God’s command an epistemic problem for Divine Command Theory?","back":"People disagree about what God has commanded.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"People disagree about what God has commanded.","correct":true,"explanation":"Different scriptures, traditions and interpretations produce conflicting accounts of divine commands, making it difficult to know reliably which actions God actually requires or forbids."},{"text":"People disagree about whether actions have consequences.","correct":false,"explanation":"Consequences can normally be investigated through evidence, so this is not the central epistemic difficulty. The problem is disagreement about what God has commanded."},{"text":"People disagree about how pleasure should be measured.","correct":false,"explanation":"Measuring pleasure is primarily a problem for utilitarianism, not Divine Command Theory. The relevant epistemic problem is uncertainty and disagreement about what God has commanded."},{"text":"People disagree about whether virtues require practice.","correct":false,"explanation":"The development of virtues belongs mainly to virtue ethics. Divine Command Theory instead faces the epistemic challenge that people disagree about what God has commanded."}]},{"id":"ac5b48d6-2969-485a-9122-8cef01bd236d","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Ethical naturalism explains moral terms using [ ].","back":"Ethical naturalism explains moral terms using natural facts.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"natural facts","correct":true,"explanation":"Ethical naturalism holds that moral terms can be defined or explained through objective features of the natural world, such as pleasure, wellbeing or other observable facts."},{"text":"divine commands","correct":false,"explanation":"Defining morality through God’s will is Divine Command Theory, not ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism explains moral terms by referring to natural facts."},{"text":"moral intuitions","correct":false,"explanation":"Appealing to direct moral intuition is associated with intuitionist non-naturalism. 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Utilitarians identify good with pleasure, happiness or welfare and assess resulting consequences."},{"text":"Virtue, character or moderation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Virtue and character belong to virtue ethics, which focuses on the moral agent. Utilitarian naturalism defines good in terms of pleasure, happiness or welfare."},{"text":"Faith, revelation or worship.","correct":false,"explanation":"Faith and revelation may ground religious ethics, but they do not define good in utilitarian naturalism. Here, good means pleasure, happiness or welfare."}]},{"id":"fa76f229-9865-4500-addd-0334cd8b4c59","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"In utilitarian naturalism, what makes an action right?","back":"It produces the best consequences.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It produces the best consequences.","correct":true,"explanation":"Utilitarianism is consequentialist, so an action is right when its outcomes maximise overall pleasure, happiness or welfare compared with the available alternatives."},{"text":"It follows the strictest moral rule.","correct":false,"explanation":"Treating rule-following as decisive confuses utilitarianism with deontological ethics. In utilitarian naturalism, an action is right because it produces the best consequences."},{"text":"It expresses a virtuous intention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Focusing on virtue or intention overlooks utilitarianism’s consequentialism. An action is right when it produces the best consequences, not merely when the agent means well."},{"text":"It obeys the clearest divine command.","correct":false,"explanation":"Obedience to God is the standard used by Divine Command Theory. Utilitarian naturalism instead judges an action right when it produces the best consequences."}]},{"id":"8dd51876-4b08-497e-8d5c-ac37d6ffdd02","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Bentham’s classical utilitarianism is naturalist because it treats pleasure and pain as [ ] features of experience.","back":"Bentham’s classical utilitarianism is naturalist because it treats pleasure and pain as measurable features of experience.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"measurable","correct":true,"explanation":"Bentham’s felicific calculus treats pleasure and pain as features that can be compared using factors such as intensity, duration, certainty and extent."},{"text":"supernatural","correct":false,"explanation":"Calling pleasure and pain supernatural would conflict with naturalism. Bentham regards them as measurable features of ordinary experience that can be compared through the felicific calculus."},{"text":"meaningless","correct":false,"explanation":"The view that moral claims lack factual meaning is closer to some non-cognitivist theories. Bentham instead treats pleasure and pain as measurable features of experience."},{"text":"incomparable","correct":false,"explanation":"Bentham’s quantitative approach assumes pleasures and pains can be compared, rather than being incomparable. Their measurable features allow consequences to be assessed through the felicific calculus."}]},{"id":"ee0eda72-de70-4c74-a15e-e81ed87e0f3e","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why is utilitarian naturalism practical and evidence-based?","back":"It asks what reduces suffering and promotes wellbeing.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It asks what reduces suffering and promotes wellbeing.","correct":true,"explanation":"Utilitarian naturalism evaluates observable effects on sentient beings, using evidence about suffering and wellbeing to determine which action is likely to produce the best consequences."},{"text":"It asks what follows tradition and preserves authority.","correct":false,"explanation":"Following tradition does not necessarily improve outcomes and is not utilitarianism’s evidence-based test. The theory asks what reduces suffering and promotes wellbeing."},{"text":"It asks what obeys revelation and fulfils duty.","correct":false,"explanation":"Revelation and duty belong to religious or deontological approaches rather than evidence-based utilitarianism. Utilitarian naturalism asks what reduces suffering and promotes wellbeing."},{"text":"It asks what develops courage and displays virtue.","correct":false,"explanation":"Developing courage and displaying virtue reflect virtue ethics, which focuses on character. Utilitarian naturalism is practical because it asks what reduces suffering and promotes wellbeing."}]},{"id":"49adf854-e53c-4495-8c00-655ed8d78720","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which Moore criticism targets defining "good" as pleasure?","back":"The naturalistic fallacy.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The naturalistic fallacy.","correct":true,"explanation":"Moore argues that defining the simple, non-natural property of goodness as any natural property, including pleasure, mistakenly reduces what good means to a natural feature."},{"text":"The Euthyphro dilemma.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Euthyphro dilemma challenges Divine Command Theory by asking whether God commands goodness or creates it. Moore’s objection to defining good as pleasure is the naturalistic fallacy."},{"text":"The verification principle.","correct":false,"explanation":"The verification principle concerns whether statements are meaningful through empirical verification, not Moore’s critique of naturalist definitions. His criticism is the naturalistic fallacy."},{"text":"The categorical imperative.","correct":false,"explanation":"The categorical imperative is Kant’s principle for testing moral duties, not a criticism developed by Moore. Moore calls defining good as pleasure the naturalistic fallacy."}]},{"id":"2c1aa61e-473a-4077-9731-d08161825519","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"If "This is pleasant, but is it good?" remains meaningful, then good cannot simply mean [ ].","back":"If "This is pleasant, but is it good?" remains meaningful, then good cannot simply mean pleasant.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"pleasant","correct":true,"explanation":"Moore’s open question argument shows that ‘good’ cannot mean ‘pleasant’, because it remains meaningful to ask whether something pleasant is also good."},{"text":"desirable","correct":false,"explanation":"‘Desirable’ is another proposed definition of good, but the example specifically leaves open whether pleasure is good. The missing term is ‘pleasant’."},{"text":"enjoyable","correct":false,"explanation":"‘Enjoyable’ is closely related to pleasure but does not reproduce the definition being tested. The meaningful question shows that ‘good’ cannot simply mean ‘pleasant’."},{"text":"valuable","correct":false,"explanation":"‘Valuable’ is too closely connected to moral goodness to identify the naturalistic definition under discussion. The open question here challenges the claim that ‘good’ means ‘pleasant’."}]},{"id":"f145274a-f5c0-4daa-baed-955216670102","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What practical problem affects using pleasure and pain in utilitarian naturalism?","back":"They are hard to measure, compare and predict.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They are hard to measure, compare and predict.","correct":true,"explanation":"Pleasure and pain are subjective experiences, making their intensity difficult to quantify, compare between people and predict as consequences of possible actions."},{"text":"They are easy to observe, calculate and guarantee.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the practical difficulty: pleasure and pain cannot be observed or guaranteed with precision. They are hard to measure, compare and predict."},{"text":"They are impossible to experience, recognise and describe.","correct":false,"explanation":"People can experience, recognise and describe pleasure and pain, although imperfectly. The real problem is that they are hard to measure, compare and predict."},{"text":"They are required to ignore, exclude and prevent.","correct":false,"explanation":"Utilitarianism does not require pleasure and pain to be excluded; they are central to its calculations. The difficulty is measuring, comparing and predicting them."}]},{"id":"81d0ff90-936a-45e6-9b4a-27f73925677c","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What injustice can utilitarian naturalism seem to justify?","back":"Punishing an innocent person to maximise happiness overall.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Punishing an innocent person to maximise happiness overall.","correct":true,"explanation":"Act utilitarian reasoning can permit punishing someone known to be innocent if doing so produces greater overall happiness, apparently sacrificing justice for aggregate welfare."},{"text":"Punishing a guilty person to uphold justice overall.","correct":false,"explanation":"Punishing someone who is guilty is not the injustice identified by this objection. The concern is that maximising happiness could justify punishing an innocent person."},{"text":"Acquitting an innocent person to respect evidence overall.","correct":false,"explanation":"Acquitting someone who is innocent does not illustrate an unjust utilitarian sacrifice. The objection concerns punishing an innocent person when this would maximise overall happiness."},{"text":"Rewarding a deserving person to encourage virtue overall.","correct":false,"explanation":"Rewarding someone who deserves it is not the injustice raised against utilitarian naturalism. The classic objection is that it may justify punishing an innocent person."}]},{"id":"fe48bc43-3b4d-4157-a3c5-5968b8fea59f","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Ethical non-naturalism says moral properties are real but not reducible to [ ].","back":"Ethical non-naturalism says moral properties are real but not reducible to natural facts.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"natural facts","correct":true,"explanation":"Ethical non-naturalism holds that moral properties such as goodness are objective and real, but cannot be defined or reduced entirely to natural, scientifically observable facts."},{"text":"moral truths","correct":false,"explanation":"Non-naturalism affirms rather than rejects real moral truths. Its distinctive claim is that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural facts."},{"text":"ethical duties","correct":false,"explanation":"Ethical duties are themselves part of morality, not the category to which non-naturalists deny reduction. They argue that moral properties are not reducible to natural facts."},{"text":"intuitive beliefs","correct":false,"explanation":"Intuitive beliefs may provide access to moral truths in intuitionism, but they are not what moral properties resist reduction to. The required term is ‘natural facts’."}]},{"id":"0041a1b7-455d-4f4b-8060-507ea07936b9","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"How are basic moral truths known in intuitionism?","back":"Directly through moral intuition.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Directly through moral intuition.","correct":true,"explanation":"Intuitionists maintain that fundamental moral truths are self-evident and apprehended directly by moral intuition, rather than inferred from non-moral evidence or calculated consequences."},{"text":"Indirectly through scientific observation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Scientific observation identifies empirical facts, whereas intuitionism treats basic moral truths as known directly. They are apprehended through moral intuition rather than observation."},{"text":"Mathematically through hedonic calculation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Hedonic calculation belongs to utilitarian attempts to assess pleasure and pain, not intuitionist moral knowledge. Intuitionism says basic moral truths are known directly through moral intuition."},{"text":"Collectively through social agreement.","correct":false,"explanation":"Social agreement may shape accepted conventions, but intuitionists do not make consensus the source of basic moral knowledge. Such truths are known directly through moral intuition."}]},{"id":"3f7a3882-c678-462b-8774-aedeca7dd483","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Moore compares good to [ ]: recognisable, but not reducible to simpler parts.","back":"Moore compares good to yellow: recognisable, but not reducible to simpler parts.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"yellow","correct":true,"explanation":"Moore argues that good, like yellow, is a simple and indefinable quality: it can be recognised directly but cannot be analysed into more basic components."},{"text":"pleasure","correct":false,"explanation":"Pleasure is a natural property that some naturalists identify with goodness, an equation Moore rejects. His analogy for a simple, recognisable quality is yellow."},{"text":"beauty","correct":false,"explanation":"Beauty may also resist simple definition, but it is not Moore’s chosen comparison in this argument. He compares the simple property good to yellow."},{"text":"justice","correct":false,"explanation":"Justice is another moral concept rather than the simple sensory quality used in Moore’s analogy. Moore compares good with yellow to illustrate indefinability."}]},{"id":"0f59ec22-8d55-49cf-a79a-36c2a29afcda","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"For Prichard, what must be understood before recognising what you ought to do?","back":"The situation’s relevant facts.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The situation’s relevant facts.","correct":true,"explanation":"Prichard argues that once the relevant non-moral facts of a particular situation are properly understood, the obligation arising from them is recognised intuitively."},{"text":"Society’s prevailing moral rules.","correct":false,"explanation":"Prichard does not ground an obligation in whatever rules society currently accepts. A person must first understand the situation’s relevant facts, then intuit what ought to be done."},{"text":"Your own strongest personal desires.","correct":false,"explanation":"Personal desire does not determine moral obligation for Prichard. Recognition of duty follows from correctly understanding the situation’s relevant facts, not from identifying what one wants most."},{"text":"The action’s formal legal status.","correct":false,"explanation":"Legality and morality can diverge, so legal classification does not reveal duty by itself. Prichard requires understanding the situation’s relevant facts before intuitively recognising the obligation."}]},{"id":"4c52a893-cb1a-4730-9419-441ffe1affc6","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What is the main disagreement problem for intuitionism?","back":"Sincere people have conflicting moral intuitions.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Sincere people have conflicting moral intuitions.","correct":true,"explanation":"If moral intuition gives direct access to objective truths, sincere and informed people should seemingly agree. Their conflicting intuitions therefore cast doubt on its reliability."},{"text":"Sincere people reach identical moral conclusions.","correct":false,"explanation":"Agreement would support rather than create the disagreement problem for intuitionism. The difficulty is that sincere people can have conflicting moral intuitions about the same issue."},{"text":"Dishonest people conceal shared moral intuitions.","correct":false,"explanation":"The objection does not depend on dishonesty or concealed agreement. It arises because even sincere people report conflicting moral intuitions, undermining confidence in intuition’s reliability."},{"text":"Uninformed people lack developed moral vocabulary.","correct":false,"explanation":"Limited vocabulary may hinder discussion, but it is not the central disagreement objection. The challenge is that sincere people can possess genuinely conflicting moral intuitions."}]},{"id":"a9b7a995-2036-4d65-9ca4-67d59329431a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What problem does intuitionism face with prejudice, emotion or upbringing?","back":"They are hard to distinguish from genuine intuition.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They are hard to distinguish from genuine intuition.","correct":true,"explanation":"Intuitionism offers no objective test for separating genuine moral intuitions from reactions shaped by prejudice, emotion or upbringing, so supposedly self-evident moral knowledge may be unreliable."},{"text":"They are always corrected by genuine intuition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Intuitionism cannot guarantee that genuine intuition will correct prejudiced or emotional judgements. The problem is that such influences are hard to distinguish from genuine intuition."},{"text":"They are completely unrelated to genuine intuition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Prejudice, emotion and upbringing can strongly shape what people experience as intuitive. The challenge for intuitionism is distinguishing these influences from genuine intuition, not treating them as unrelated."},{"text":"They are reliable sources of genuine intuition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Treating prejudice, emotion and upbringing as reliable moral sources ignores how they can distort judgement. Intuitionism struggles because their influence is hard to distinguish from genuine intuition."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-27","paperLabel":"Paper 1"},"heading":"Introduction to meta ethics: the meaning of right and wrong","title":"Introduction to meta ethics: the meaning of right and wrong Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/a-level/religious-studies/aqa/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L39"}]}],"topicId":"eb562772-fb7f-509b-b2bd-463bfdeb47d8","walled":"$L3a"}],"$L3b","$L3c"]