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states.","correct":true,"explanation":"Global governance depends on cooperation and consent because no central enforcement body has automatic authority to police states in the way a national government polices its territory."},{"text":"A network of international institutions that coordinates state cooperation.","correct":false,"explanation":"International institutions are a central part of global governance, rather than something it lacks. What is absent is a global police force with automatic authority over states."},{"text":"A system of international law that influences state behaviour.","correct":false,"explanation":"International law already helps global governance shape state behaviour, although enforcement is uneven. The key missing feature is a global police force with automatic authority over states."},{"text":"A forum for diplomatic negotiation between sovereign states.","correct":false,"explanation":"Organisations such as the United Nations provide forums for diplomatic negotiation. Global governance instead lacks a global police force able to exercise automatic authority over states."}]},{"id":"86a49e21-9941-4233-a180-49f8d4dbf73c","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"State sovereignty is a state's legal and political authority to govern itself within its [ ].","back":"State sovereignty is a state's legal and political authority to govern itself within its territory.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"territory","correct":true,"explanation":"Sovereignty gives a state supreme legal and political authority within its defined territory, including authority over the people, institutions and activities located there."},{"text":"population","correct":false,"explanation":"A population is one component of a state, but sovereignty is exercised across a geographical territory. It is not limited only to the people living there."},{"text":"government","correct":false,"explanation":"Government is the institution that exercises state authority, not the area within which sovereignty applies. A state governs itself within its territory."},{"text":"constitution","correct":false,"explanation":"A constitution establishes domestic rules and institutions, but it is not the geographical domain of sovereignty. State authority is exercised within the state’s territory."}]},{"id":"fededc1e-edf5-45cf-87c9-b07dd4bc13f8","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can global governance limit state sovereignty?","back":"It sets international limits on domestic actions, e.g. torture or pollution.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It sets international limits on domestic actions, e.g. torture or pollution.","correct":true,"explanation":"International human rights and environmental rules restrict what governments may do within their own borders, placing agreed international limits on otherwise domestic policy choices."},{"text":"It gives national governments unrestricted control over domestic actions.","correct":false,"explanation":"Unrestricted domestic control describes absolute sovereignty, not its limitation. Global governance constrains states by setting international limits on actions such as torture or pollution."},{"text":"It removes all domestic authority from states over torture or pollution.","correct":false,"explanation":"Global governance constrains particular state actions but does not abolish all domestic authority. States retain government powers while operating within international limits."},{"text":"It applies international rules only when every state agrees.","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses global governance with a requirement for unanimous consent. International norms and obligations can constrain domestic actions without every state agreeing to each decision."}]},{"id":"a360cbc3-1103-4daa-9d40-6be9b0d53f6a","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The [ ] is not a strict treaty, but has major [ ].","back":"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 is not a strict treaty, but has major moral and political authority.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 is not a strict treaty, but has major moral and political authority.","correct":true,"explanation":"The UDHR is a declaration rather than a legally binding treaty, but its global status and influence give it substantial moral and political authority."},{"text":"The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 is not a strict treaty, but has major moral and political authority.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICCPR is a legally binding treaty for states that have ratified it. The non-treaty document with major moral and political authority is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948."},{"text":"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 is not a strict treaty, but has major binding legal authority.","correct":false,"explanation":"The UDHR strongly influences international standards, but it is not itself a binding treaty. Its importance rests primarily on its moral and political authority."},{"text":"The European Convention on Human Rights 1950 is not a strict treaty, but has major binding legal authority.","correct":false,"explanation":"The European Convention is a regional treaty creating binding legal obligations for participating states. The UDHR is the non-treaty declaration known for moral and political authority."}]},{"id":"07d2a2da-2aba-4e59-9c52-dbac6adc387f","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What shift does modern human rights law make in global politics?","back":"Individuals become rights-holders under international law, not only state subjects.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Individuals become rights-holders under international law, not only state subjects.","correct":true,"explanation":"Modern human rights law recognises individuals as possessing rights protected by international standards, reducing the traditional view that their treatment is solely a domestic state matter."},{"text":"States remain the only rights-holders under international law, while individuals lack protection.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reflects the older state-centred model of international politics. Modern human rights law also recognises individuals as rights-holders under international law."},{"text":"Individuals gain rights only through domestic law, not through international standards.","correct":false,"explanation":"Domestic law remains important, but modern human rights law establishes international rights and standards as well. Individuals are therefore rights-holders under international law."},{"text":"Governments become rights-holders against their own citizens, rather than protectors of individuals.","correct":false,"explanation":"Human rights law primarily protects individuals from abuses of governmental power. It recognises individuals, rather than governments acting against citizens, as international rights-holders."}]},{"id":"9020e872-2a99-421b-beed-cc31a6fbaa98","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why does the ICJ not prosecute individual leaders?","back":"It settles legal disputes between states; it does not try individuals.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It settles legal disputes between states; it does not try individuals.","correct":true,"explanation":"The ICJ’s jurisdiction concerns disputes submitted by states and certain advisory opinions. Criminal responsibility of individual leaders falls outside its role."},{"text":"It prosecutes individual leaders for international crimes; it does not hear state disputes.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the roles of the ICJ and ICC. The ICC prosecutes individuals, while the ICJ settles legal disputes between states and does not conduct criminal trials."},{"text":"It advises national courts on criminal sentences; it cannot hear interstate cases.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICJ may give advisory opinions to authorised international bodies, not sentencing advice to national courts. Its main role is resolving legal disputes between states."},{"text":"It enforces UN resolutions through criminal trials; it can imprison individuals.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICJ has no criminal jurisdiction or prison system and does not prosecute individuals. It decides legal disputes between states and may issue advisory opinions."}]},{"id":"2701d218-8fca-498d-a16e-52ba9cdd6e6b","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The ICC was created by the [ ] and has operated since [ ].","back":"The ICC was created by the Rome Statute 1998 and has operated since 2002.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The ICC was created by the Rome Statute 1998 and has operated since 2002.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002 after sufficient ratifications, allowing the International Criminal Court to begin operating."},{"text":"The ICC was created by the Rome Statute 1998 and has operated since 1998.","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses the Statute’s adoption with the Court’s commencement. The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, but the ICC began operating in 2002."},{"text":"The ICC was created by the Geneva Conventions 1949 and has operated since 2002.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Geneva Conventions regulate conduct during armed conflict but did not establish the ICC. The Court was created by the Rome Statute 1998 and began operating in 2002."},{"text":"The ICC was created by the Rome Statute 2002 and has operated since 2003.","correct":false,"explanation":"This shifts both dates forward by confusing adoption, entry into force and early activity. The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, and the ICC operated from 2002."}]},{"id":"2558cb93-a9aa-471b-bd05-374d17dbc2b9","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why does the ICC challenge sovereignty more directly than the ICJ?","back":"It tries individuals for international crimes.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It tries individuals for international crimes.","correct":true,"explanation":"By prosecuting individual leaders and officials, the ICC can reach directly into matters states traditionally controlled, making its challenge to sovereignty more direct than the ICJ’s."},{"text":"It settles disputes between states over international law.","correct":false,"explanation":"Settling interstate legal disputes is the ICJ’s role and depends heavily on state participation. The ICC challenges sovereignty more directly by trying individuals for international crimes."},{"text":"It issues non-binding advice to governments on human rights.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICC is a criminal court rather than an advisory human rights body. Its direct challenge to sovereignty comes from prosecuting individuals for international crimes."},{"text":"It prosecutes states for breaching international treaties.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICC has jurisdiction over individual people, not states, and focuses on specified international crimes. Trying individuals is what makes its impact on sovereignty especially direct."}]},{"id":"6f412f3e-a008-41ad-bb30-d398ae2f100d","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the [ ], not the [ ].","back":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the Council of Europe, not the European Union.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the Council of Europe, not the European Union.","correct":true,"explanation":"The Court enforces the European Convention on Human Rights, a Council of Europe treaty. It is institutionally separate from the European Union and its Court of Justice."},{"text":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the European Union, not the Council of Europe.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses two distinct European institutions. The Court belongs to the Council of Europe system, while the European Union has its own Court of Justice."},{"text":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the United Nations, not the European Union.","correct":false,"explanation":"Confusing international human-rights bodies makes this tempting, but the Court is linked to the Council of Europe, which administers the European Convention on Human Rights."},{"text":"The European Court of Human Rights is linked to the European Council, not the European Commission.","correct":false,"explanation":"The similar institutional names cause confusion, but both named bodies are EU institutions. The Court is linked to the Council of Europe, not the European Union."}]},{"id":"4305cf82-69e7-47dc-a3c1-4da41cd4065f","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What usually limits enforcement by human rights courts?","back":"They rely on state cooperation for consent, arrests or enforcement.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They rely on state cooperation for consent, arrests or enforcement.","correct":true,"explanation":"Human rights courts generally lack their own police or enforcement agencies. They therefore depend on governments to accept jurisdiction, arrest suspects and implement judgments."},{"text":"They rely on media cooperation for consent, arrests or enforcement.","correct":false,"explanation":"Media attention may create political pressure, but journalists cannot provide legal consent, conduct arrests or enforce judgments. Human rights courts rely principally on state cooperation."},{"text":"They rely on judicial precedent for consent, arrests or enforcement.","correct":false,"explanation":"Precedent guides legal reasoning but supplies no practical enforcement capacity. Courts still require state cooperation to recognise jurisdiction, arrest suspects and carry out decisions."},{"text":"They rely on public referendums for consent, arrests or enforcement.","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses democratic approval with legal enforcement. Human rights courts do not normally require referendums; they depend on states to consent and implement their rulings."}]},{"id":"1aa7b925-3204-45ed-9724-bede0fd57abf","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What condition is used to justify humanitarian intervention?","back":"Preventing mass suffering or atrocity inside a state.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Preventing mass suffering or atrocity inside a state.","correct":true,"explanation":"Humanitarian intervention is justified as action to protect populations from extreme harm, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity."},{"text":"Protecting foreign trade or investment inside a state.","correct":false,"explanation":"Economic interests may motivate foreign policy, but they do not constitute a humanitarian justification. The accepted condition is preventing mass suffering or atrocity within a state."},{"text":"Removing unpopular political leaders inside a state.","correct":false,"explanation":"Regime change based merely on a leader’s unpopularity is not humanitarian intervention. The claimed justification must be protection from mass suffering or atrocity."},{"text":"Resolving minor constitutional disputes inside a state.","correct":false,"explanation":"Domestic political disagreements do not meet the high humanitarian threshold. Intervention is justified by the need to prevent mass suffering or atrocities, not ordinary constitutional disputes."}]},{"id":"cf539890-f624-462f-89b5-d79155fa5b9a","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Why was NATO's Kosovo 1999 intervention legally controversial?","back":"It lacked explicit UN Security Council authorisation.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It lacked explicit UN Security Council authorisation.","correct":true,"explanation":"NATO acted without a Security Council resolution expressly authorising force. Supporters claimed humanitarian legitimacy, but the absence of explicit authorisation made its legality disputed."},{"text":"It lacked formal approval from NATO members.","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses alliance approval with international legal authority. NATO members conducted the operation collectively; the controversy arose because there was no explicit UN Security Council authorisation."},{"text":"It lacked evidence of humanitarian suffering.","correct":false,"explanation":"There was substantial evidence of violence and displacement in Kosovo. The legal dispute centred instead on NATO using force without explicit UN Security Council authorisation."},{"text":"It lacked support from neighbouring European states.","correct":false,"explanation":"Regional political support was not the central legal issue, and several European states participated. The controversy concerned the absence of explicit UN Security Council authorisation."}]},{"id":"406e4ba6-7efd-42f9-8e72-59c188946609","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What did Rwanda 1994 show about non-intervention?","back":"Failure to intervene allowed genocide killing about 800,000.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Failure to intervene allowed genocide killing about 800,000.","correct":true,"explanation":"During roughly 100 days, around 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered. The international failure to intervene demonstrated the catastrophic risks of strict non-intervention."},{"text":"Failure to intervene allowed genocide killing about 80,000.","correct":false,"explanation":"This underestimates the death toll by a factor of ten. The 1994 Rwandan genocide killed about 800,000 people, exposing the consequences of international inaction."},{"text":"Failure to intervene allowed ethnic cleansing killing about 8,000.","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses Rwanda with the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, where about 8,000 were killed. Rwanda experienced genocide that killed approximately 800,000 people."},{"text":"Failure to intervene allowed civil conflict killing about 80,000.","correct":false,"explanation":"Describing the event merely as civil conflict understates its organised genocidal character, while the figure is far too low. About 800,000 people were killed in genocide."}]},{"id":"e4d82e98-815e-4fc8-b6ae-23011202d1c1","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"R2P was endorsed at the [ ] and redefines sovereignty as [ ].","back":"R2P was endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit and redefines sovereignty as responsibility.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"R2P was endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit and redefines sovereignty as responsibility.","correct":true,"explanation":"UN member states endorsed the Responsibility to Protect in 2005, affirming that sovereignty includes a state’s responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities."},{"text":"R2P was endorsed at the 2001 ICISS report and redefines sovereignty as responsibility.","correct":false,"explanation":"The ICISS report developed and popularised R2P in 2001, but it did not provide universal state endorsement. That occurred at the 2005 UN World Summit."},{"text":"R2P was endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit and redefines sovereignty as absolute control.","correct":false,"explanation":"The date is correct, but R2P rejects the idea that sovereignty means unrestricted control. It reframes sovereignty as responsibility for protecting populations from mass atrocities."},{"text":"R2P was endorsed at the 2011 Security Council and redefines sovereignty as non-interference.","correct":false,"explanation":"Security Council action over Libya applied R2P in 2011 rather than originally endorsing it. R2P was endorsed in 2005 and defines sovereignty as responsibility."}]},{"id":"903d4622-fe84-4722-90f1-0f3bf16e0296","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why is R2P controversial for state sovereignty?","back":"It can justify external pressure, sanctions or military force.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It can justify external pressure, sanctions or military force.","correct":true,"explanation":"R2P permits escalating international action when a state fails to protect its population. Critics argue that such measures weaken sovereignty and enable outside interference."},{"text":"It can guarantee complete immunity from external intervention.","correct":false,"explanation":"This describes absolute sovereignty, which R2P challenges rather than guarantees. R2P is controversial because it may justify external pressure, sanctions or military force."},{"text":"It can prohibit international responses to domestic atrocities.","correct":false,"explanation":"R2P was created to enable collective responses when states fail to prevent mass atrocities. Its potential to legitimise outside action is precisely why sovereignty concerns arise."},{"text":"It can require unconditional respect for state non-interference.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses R2P’s core principle. Sovereignty is conditional on protecting populations, so failure may justify external pressure, sanctions or, in extreme cases, military force."}]},{"id":"eb81afe1-0c6b-4a6f-85a4-45123b15e4a1","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What did Syria show about R2P's limits?","back":"It depends on great-power consent; Russia and China blocked action.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It depends on great-power consent; Russia and China blocked action.","correct":true,"explanation":"Coercive UN action generally requires Security Council agreement. Russian and Chinese vetoes prevented a unified response to Syria, showing how great-power interests can obstruct R2P."},{"text":"It depends on small-state consent; Jordan and Lebanon blocked action.","correct":false,"explanation":"Neighbouring small states did not possess the Security Council veto power that obstructed action. Russia and China blocked measures, demonstrating R2P’s dependence on great-power consent."},{"text":"It depends on General Assembly unanimity; India and Brazil blocked action.","correct":false,"explanation":"R2P enforcement does not require a unanimous General Assembly vote. The decisive obstacle was disagreement in the Security Council, where Russia and China blocked action."},{"text":"It depends on regional organisation approval; NATO and the EU blocked action.","correct":false,"explanation":"Neither NATO nor the EU held the decisive legal veto over UN coercive measures. Russia and China blocked Security Council action, revealing dependence on great-power consent."}]},{"id":"d8ef10f5-8950-4b98-8b22-620c5735ee64","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How does the tragedy of the commons explain climate change?","back":"Actors gain individually by overusing the atmosphere while costs spread globally.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Actors gain individually by overusing the atmosphere while costs spread globally.","correct":true,"explanation":"The atmosphere is a shared resource: each actor benefits from emitting greenhouse gases, while the resulting climate damage is distributed across countries and populations worldwide."},{"text":"Actors lose individually by overusing the atmosphere while costs remain private.","correct":false,"explanation":"Climate change does not arise because atmospheric use imposes costs solely on the actor responsible. The tragedy occurs because individual benefits are private while climate costs spread globally."},{"text":"Actors gain individually by protecting the atmosphere while benefits spread globally.","correct":false,"explanation":"Voluntary restraint would protect rather than deplete the shared atmosphere. The tragedy of the commons describes actors gaining individually from overuse while collectively sharing the resulting global costs."},{"text":"Actors gain collectively by privatising the atmosphere while costs remain national.","correct":false,"explanation":"The atmosphere is not privately owned by individual states, making exclusion difficult. Actors benefit individually from overuse, while the environmental costs are spread globally."}]},{"id":"6e6fcdc1-1280-4b88-9e66-49a25ce2219b","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the [ ] and provides the main [ ] for climate negotiations.","back":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the Rio Earth Summit 1992 and provides the main treaty framework for climate negotiations.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the Rio Earth Summit 1992 and provides the main treaty framework for climate negotiations.","correct":true,"explanation":"The UNFCCC opened for signature at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and established the central international treaty framework through which subsequent climate agreements and negotiations developed."},{"text":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the Kyoto Conference 1997 and provides the main scientific assessment for climate negotiations.","correct":false,"explanation":"Kyoto produced a protocol under the UNFCCC rather than establishing the convention itself, and the IPCC is a scientific assessment body, not the framework for negotiations."},{"text":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the Paris Conference 2015 and provides the main enforcement mechanism for climate negotiations.","correct":false,"explanation":"The Paris conference adopted a later agreement within the UNFCCC system. The convention originated at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and supplies the main treaty framework."},{"text":"The UNFCCC was agreed at the Stockholm Conference 1972 and provides the main global carbon market for climate negotiations.","correct":false,"explanation":"Stockholm was an important 1972 environmental conference, but the UNFCCC was agreed at Rio in 1992. It created a treaty framework, not a global emissions market."}]},{"id":"42972013-0b4b-4684-871e-47e56f6c5a33","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Which UNFCCC principle says developed states should do more on climate?","back":"Common but differentiated responsibilities.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Common but differentiated responsibilities.","correct":true,"explanation":"This principle recognises that all states share responsibility for climate action, but developed states should shoulder more because of their historical emissions and greater capabilities."},{"text":"The precautionary principle.","correct":false,"explanation":"The precautionary principle supports action despite scientific uncertainty, but it does not specifically allocate greater obligations to developed states. That function belongs to common but differentiated responsibilities."},{"text":"The polluter pays principle.","correct":false,"explanation":"The polluter pays principle assigns costs to those causing pollution, but the UNFCCC’s explicit basis for different developed-state obligations is common but differentiated responsibilities."},{"text":"The sustainable development principle.","correct":false,"explanation":"Sustainable development seeks to reconcile present needs with future welfare, but it does not itself require developed states to do more. Common but differentiated responsibilities does."}]},{"id":"2dbfc552-9af9-41a6-978b-dc86dc4a587b","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"The IPCC [ ]; it does not [ ].","back":"The IPCC assesses existing climate science; it does not conduct original experiments.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The IPCC assesses existing climate science; it does not conduct original experiments.","correct":true,"explanation":"The IPCC synthesises and evaluates published research to establish the state of scientific knowledge. It does not operate as a laboratory carrying out its own original experiments."},{"text":"The IPCC negotiates binding climate treaties; it does not set national emissions targets.","correct":false,"explanation":"Negotiating binding climate treaties is undertaken by states through institutions such as the UNFCCC. The IPCC assesses existing science rather than setting legal emissions targets."},{"text":"The IPCC conducts original experiments; it does not assess existing climate science.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the IPCC’s role. It assesses existing published climate science and draws policy-relevant conclusions, but it does not conduct original experiments itself."},{"text":"The IPCC monitors national carbon emissions; it does not enforce international treaties.","correct":false,"explanation":"The IPCC may evaluate research concerning emissions, but it neither monitors every state’s emissions directly nor enforces treaties. Its core role is assessing existing climate science."}]},{"id":"e8fdbdf5-e40b-47f3-8c5f-54ca97a99e4b","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"How do shallow-green and deep-green ecology differ?","back":"

Shallow-green: reformist, human-centred, technology and regulation.
Deep-green: ecocentric, criticises consumerism and endless growth.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Shallow-green: reformist, human-centred, technology and regulation.
Deep-green: ecocentric, criticises consumerism and endless growth.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Shallow-green ecology seeks environmental improvement within existing human-centred political and economic systems. Deep-green ecology gives nature intrinsic value and challenges consumerism and perpetual growth."},{"text":"

Shallow-green: ecocentric, criticises consumerism and endless growth.
Deep-green: reformist, human-centred, technology and regulation.

","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the two perspectives. Shallow-green ecology favours reform, technology and regulation, whereas deep-green ecology is ecocentric and questions consumerism and endless economic growth."},{"text":"

Shallow-green: anti-technology, rejects regulation and markets.
Deep-green: anthropocentric, prioritises consumption and economic growth.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Shallow-green ecology does not reject technological solutions, and deep-green ecology does not prioritise economic growth. Shallow approaches are reformist, while deep approaches challenge consumerism and anthropocentrism."},{"text":"

Shallow-green: revolutionary, ecocentric, opposes technological solutions.
Deep-green: reformist, human-centred, supports endless growth.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Both descriptions misclassify the approaches. Shallow-green thinking works within existing systems using regulation and technology, while deep-green thinking is ecocentric and challenges endless growth."}]},{"id":"659746bc-233a-4093-9e0a-635bfd636a98","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"Why is Paris broader but less coercive than Kyoto?","back":"

Paris: near-universal voluntary nationally determined contributions.
Kyoto: binding targets mainly for developed states.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Paris: near-universal voluntary nationally determined contributions.
Kyoto: binding targets mainly for developed states.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Paris secured participation from almost every state by allowing nationally determined contributions, which are not internationally binding emissions quotas. Kyoto imposed binding targets principally on developed states."},{"text":"

Paris: binding targets mainly for developed states.
Kyoto: near-universal voluntary nationally determined contributions.

","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the agreements. Paris achieved near-universal participation through nationally determined contributions, while Kyoto’s internationally binding reduction targets applied mainly to developed states."},{"text":"

Paris: universal binding targets set by the UN.
Kyoto: voluntary targets chosen by all states.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Paris does not impose uniform binding targets, and Kyoto did not give every state voluntary contributions. Paris is broader because contributions are nationally determined, but consequently less coercive."},{"text":"

Paris: voluntary targets only for developed states.
Kyoto: binding targets equally for all states.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Paris includes developing states rather than exempting them, although their contributions are nationally determined. Kyoto’s binding targets focused on developed states rather than applying universally."}]},{"id":"e81e0132-269f-446a-8703-e91b002ccbc0","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"Why was Kyoto's coverage limited?","back":"

US signed but did not ratify.
Canada later withdrew.
China and India lacked binding reduction targets.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

US signed but did not ratify.
Canada later withdrew.
China and India lacked binding reduction targets.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Kyoto’s reach was weakened because the US never ratified, Canada withdrew, and major developing emitters such as China and India had no binding reduction targets."},{"text":"

US ratified but later withdrew.
Canada never signed the treaty.
China and India rejected all participation.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The US signed Kyoto but did not ratify it, while Canada initially ratified and later withdrew. China and India participated without binding reduction targets."},{"text":"

US accepted binding reduction targets.
Canada remained fully committed.
China and India faced identical binding targets.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Kyoto did not impose equal binding targets on all these states. Its coverage was limited because the US did not ratify, Canada withdrew, and China and India lacked binding targets."},{"text":"

US refused to sign the treaty.
Canada failed to meet entry requirements.
China and India ratified then withdrew.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The US did sign Kyoto, although it never ratified, and Canada withdrew after initially participating. China and India lacked binding reductions rather than withdrawing after ratification."}]},{"id":"d4ebc4ea-309c-4b48-896b-3613fa79fd34","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why are NGOs best seen as watchdogs rather than substitutes for states?","back":"They provide information and pressure, but cannot enforce international law.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"They provide information and pressure, but cannot enforce international law.","correct":true,"explanation":"NGOs can investigate abuses, publicise evidence, mobilise opinion and pressure governments. However, they lack the sovereign legal authority and coercive capacity needed to enforce international law."},{"text":"They provide binding rules and sanctions, and can replace national governments.","correct":false,"explanation":"NGOs can influence governments but do not possess sovereign authority to replace them or create universally binding law. Their main contributions are information, advocacy and pressure."},{"text":"They provide secrecy and enforcement, but cannot influence national governments.","correct":false,"explanation":"NGOs often expose information rather than suppressing it, and they cannot enforce international law directly. Their watchdog role rests on investigation, publicity and political pressure."},{"text":"They provide prosecutions and judgments, and can enforce international law.","correct":false,"explanation":"NGOs are not generally empowered to prosecute states or issue legally binding judgments. They function as watchdogs by supplying information and applying public and political pressure."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-12","paperLabel":"Paper 1"},"heading":"Global governance: human rights and environmental","title":"Global governance: human rights and environmental Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/a-level/politics/edexcel/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L37"}]}],"topicId":"7861a443-3326-5d9d-9724-e01ae74f36ef","walled":"$L38"}],"$L39","$L3a"]