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24:[["$","$L33",null,{"feature":"flashcards"}],"$L34",["$","$L35",null,{"href":"/a-level/economics/eduqas/oligopoly/flashcards","label":"Oligopoly","subjectCode":"a_level_economics__eduqas","surface":"flashcards"}],["$","$L36",null,{"runner":["$","div",null,{"className":"min-h-0 flex-1 overflow-hidden bg-background","children":["$","$L37",null,{"decks":[{"id":"38d6f2cb-01ba-4971-90c2-17253289efaf","title":"Oligopoly Flashcards","topicId":"96f5ed05-443f-59a4-9b1b-a0d4fa436ebe","topicSlug":"oligopoly","cards":[{"id":"24bbc364-3c14-4c67-8acd-1b03798b757f","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"A market where a few large firms dominate and react to each other’s decisions is which market structure?","back":"Oligopoly.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Oligopoly.","correct":true,"explanation":"An oligopoly is dominated by a small number of large firms whose decisions are interdependent, meaning each firm considers how rivals may respond."},{"text":"Monopoly.","correct":false,"explanation":"A monopoly has only one dominant supplier rather than a few large, interdependent firms. A market dominated by several large firms is an oligopoly."},{"text":"Monopolistic competition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Monopolistic competition contains many firms selling differentiated products, so individual firms have limited influence over rivals. A few dominant, interdependent firms characterise an oligopoly."},{"text":"Perfect competition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Perfect competition involves many small price-taking firms that cannot significantly affect one another. A few large firms reacting strategically to rivals form an oligopoly."}]},{"id":"9a328673-5009-4114-b7f3-14ac6acafdca","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In oligopoly, firms are [ ]: one firm’s decisions affect and are affected by rivals.","back":"In oligopoly, firms are interdependent: one firm’s decisions affect and are affected by rivals.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"interdependent","correct":true,"explanation":"Oligopolistic firms are interdependent because each firm’s pricing, output and advertising decisions influence its rivals and are made with likely rival reactions in mind."},{"text":"independent","correct":false,"explanation":"Treating firms as independent ignores strategic interaction between the few dominant sellers. Oligopolistic firms are interdependent because each firm’s decisions affect its rivals."},{"text":"price-taking","correct":false,"explanation":"Price-taking is associated with highly competitive markets where individual firms lack market power. Oligopolistic firms are interdependent and must anticipate competitors’ responses."},{"text":"non-competitive","correct":false,"explanation":"Oligopolistic firms still compete, even when competition is based on advertising, quality or service rather than price. Their defining relationship is that they are interdependent."}]},{"id":"276e40f1-452a-4200-8826-0b2a1f342d78","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What does the four-firm concentration ratio, CR4, add together?","back":"The market shares of the four largest firms.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The market shares of the four largest firms.","correct":true,"explanation":"CR4 measures market concentration by adding the percentage market shares held by the four largest firms, showing how much of the market they collectively control."},{"text":"The sales revenues of the four largest firms.","correct":false,"explanation":"Adding revenue figures would produce a monetary total, not a concentration ratio. CR4 adds the market shares of the four largest firms, expressed as a percentage."},{"text":"The profit margins of the four largest firms.","correct":false,"explanation":"Profit margins measure profitability rather than market concentration. CR4 is calculated by summing the market shares of the four largest firms in the market."},{"text":"The employment levels of the four largest firms.","correct":false,"explanation":"Employment levels do not directly measure firms’ shares of market sales. CR4 adds the market shares of the four largest firms to indicate concentration."}]},{"id":"df694b3f-d112-4b1d-9393-922917683cec","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Firm shares are 28%, 18%, 14%, 10%, 8% and 22% other firms. What is CR4?","back":"70%.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"70%.","correct":true,"explanation":"The four largest shares are 28%, 18%, 14% and 10%. Adding them gives $28+18+14+10=70$, so CR4 is 70%."},{"text":"60%.","correct":false,"explanation":"This adds only the three largest shares: $28+18+14=60$. CR4 requires the four largest firms, so adding another 10% gives 70%."},{"text":"78%.","correct":false,"explanation":"This includes the fifth-largest firm’s 8% share, effectively calculating a five-firm ratio. CR4 includes only 28%, 18%, 14% and 10%, giving 70%."},{"text":"64%.","correct":false,"explanation":"This results from omitting the 14% firm and including the smaller 8% firm instead. The four largest shares sum to $28+18+14+10=70$%."}]},{"id":"8bc12429-ae6b-450d-bcd2-83d8174b595e","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"A high concentration ratio suggests market power, but it does not prove [ ].","back":"A high concentration ratio suggests market power, but it does not prove collusion.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"collusion","correct":true,"explanation":"High concentration indicates that a few firms hold large market shares, but this alone does not establish that they cooperate or make agreements to restrict competition."},{"text":"interdependence","correct":false,"explanation":"A concentrated oligopoly normally implies interdependence because major firms must consider one another’s actions. What concentration alone cannot prove is that those firms collude."},{"text":"market power","correct":false,"explanation":"A high concentration ratio is evidence suggesting that leading firms may possess market power. It does not by itself prove collusion or coordinated agreements between them."},{"text":"price rigidity","correct":false,"explanation":"Price rigidity may occur in oligopoly, but it is not the claim being tested by concentration data. A high ratio cannot prove that firms are colluding."}]},{"id":"3297881e-b2d1-4b7a-b368-e434060b2595","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"How does the kinked demand curve explain price rigidity in oligopoly?","back":"

Price rise: rivals do not follow, many customers lost.
Price cut: rivals match, few customers gained.
Result: firms avoid changing price.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Price rise: rivals do not follow, many customers lost.
Price cut: rivals match, few customers gained.
Result: firms avoid changing price.

","correct":true,"explanation":"The asymmetric reactions make demand elastic above the current price and inelastic below it. Price changes are therefore unattractive, helping explain stable prices in oligopoly."},{"text":"

Price rise: rivals follow, few customers lost.
Price cut: rivals do not match, many customers gained.
Result: firms frequently change price.

","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the assumed rival responses. The model predicts rivals ignore a price rise but match a price cut, making both changes unattractive and causing price rigidity."},{"text":"

Price rise: rivals do not follow, few customers lost.
Price cut: rivals match, many customers gained.
Result: firms avoid changing price.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The customer effects are reversed. An unmatched price rise loses many customers, while a matched price cut gains few, so firms tend to retain the current price."},{"text":"

Price rise: rivals match, many customers lost.
Price cut: rivals do not match, few customers gained.
Result: firms avoid changing price.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The kinked demand model assumes rivals do not follow price rises but do match price cuts. Those expected reactions, rather than the ones stated here, discourage price changes."}]},{"id":"64dcd0f6-f31f-46fe-9ca7-8ed2d4077f8a","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively [ ] above the current price and relatively [ ] below it.","back":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively elastic above the current price and relatively inelastic below it.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively elastic above the current price and relatively inelastic below it.","correct":true,"explanation":"Above the current price, an unmatched rise loses many customers, making demand elastic. Below it, rivals match cuts, so few customers are gained and demand is inelastic."},{"text":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively inelastic above the current price and relatively elastic below it.","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the elasticities. Demand is elastic above the current price because rivals do not follow rises, but inelastic below it because rivals match cuts."},{"text":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively elastic above the current price and relatively elastic below it.","correct":false,"explanation":"Demand below the current price is not relatively elastic because rivals are expected to match price cuts, limiting the increase in quantity demanded. It is relatively inelastic below."},{"text":"In the kinked demand curve, demand is relatively inelastic above the current price and relatively inelastic below it.","correct":false,"explanation":"Demand above the current price is not relatively inelastic. Because rivals leave their prices unchanged, a firm raising its price loses many customers, making demand relatively elastic."}]},{"id":"7fb8c782-f566-4c57-a30f-d4d85e4db20a","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Advertising, loyalty schemes and better service are examples of which type of competition?","back":"Non-price competition.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Non-price competition.","correct":true,"explanation":"Non-price competition involves attracting customers through product quality, branding, advertising, loyalty rewards or service rather than by reducing the product’s price."},{"text":"Price competition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Price competition means attracting customers by lowering prices or offering direct price discounts. Advertising, loyalty schemes and improved service are forms of non-price competition."},{"text":"Perfect competition.","correct":false,"explanation":"Perfect competition is a market structure, not a method firms use to attract customers. Competing through advertising, loyalty and service is non-price competition."},{"text":"Predatory pricing.","correct":false,"explanation":"Predatory pricing involves setting exceptionally low prices to force rivals from the market. Advertising, loyalty schemes and better service instead represent non-price competition."}]},{"id":"62365082-0a2e-497c-a336-0f6ddb66c106","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can non-price competition protect incumbent oligopolists?","back":"It can create brand loyalty, acting as a barrier to entry.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"It can create brand loyalty, acting as a barrier to entry.","correct":true,"explanation":"Distinctive branding encourages customers to keep buying from established firms, reducing the appeal of new entrants and therefore creating a barrier to entry."},{"text":"It can create price transparency, removing a barrier to entry.","correct":false,"explanation":"Greater price transparency makes comparison easier and can intensify competition rather than protect incumbents. The protective effect comes from brand loyalty, which discourages customers from switching to entrants."},{"text":"It can create low switching costs, weakening a barrier to entry.","correct":false,"explanation":"Lower switching costs make it easier for consumers to try products from new firms. Non-price competition protects incumbents by creating brand loyalty, which acts as a barrier to entry."},{"text":"It can create perfect information, encouraging firms to enter.","correct":false,"explanation":"Perfect information helps consumers compare incumbents with new entrants, making entry easier. Brand loyalty instead protects established oligopolists by making customers reluctant to switch."}]},{"id":"a797790d-82af-4032-82d1-f9f90afb9ad5","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Price leadership occurs when one [ ] firm changes price and other firms [ ].","back":"Price leadership occurs when one dominant firm changes price and other firms follow.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Price leadership occurs when one dominant firm changes price and other firms follow.","correct":true,"explanation":"A dominant firm has sufficient market influence to initiate a price change. Smaller or less influential firms then follow that change rather than setting independent prices."},{"text":"Price leadership occurs when one smallest firm changes price and other firms ignore.","correct":false,"explanation":"Price leadership does not require the initiating firm to be the smallest, and rivals follow rather than ignore its change. The price leader is normally a dominant firm."},{"text":"Price leadership occurs when one dominant firm changes price and other firms undercut.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although a dominant firm initiates the change, price leadership means other firms follow it. Undercutting the leader describes active price competition rather than price leadership."},{"text":"Price leadership occurs when one competitive firm changes price and other firms follow.","correct":false,"explanation":"A competitive firm lacks the market influence associated with leadership. Price leadership occurs when a dominant firm changes its price and other firms follow."}]},{"id":"27164424-3162-43ce-86a6-10069a46b1e4","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why may smaller firms follow a price leader?","back":"

Undercutting could trigger retaliation.
Charging more could lose customers.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Undercutting could trigger retaliation.
Charging more could lose customers.

","correct":true,"explanation":"A smaller firm risks retaliation if it undercuts the leader, while setting a higher price could drive customers towards cheaper rivals. Following avoids both dangers."},{"text":"

Undercutting could encourage cooperation.
Charging more could gain customers.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Undercutting is more likely to provoke retaliation than cooperation, while charging more risks losing customers rather than gaining them. These pressures encourage smaller firms to follow."},{"text":"

Undercutting could guarantee higher profits.
Charging more could increase demand.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Undercutting can start a price war rather than guarantee higher profits, and charging more can reduce demand. Smaller firms follow to avoid retaliation and customer losses."},{"text":"

Undercutting could eliminate competition.
Charging more could protect market share.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Undercutting does not eliminate rivalry and may provoke an aggressive response, while charging more can lose price-sensitive customers. Following the leader limits both risks."}]},{"id":"d603f74c-e9c8-4300-bdd8-341254e73a76","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"[ ] is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a [ ].","back":"Collusion is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a cartel.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Collusion is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a cartel.","correct":true,"explanation":"Collusion is cooperation between firms intended to reduce competition. When this takes the form of a formal agreement to behave collectively like a monopoly, it is a cartel."},{"text":"Competition is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a cartel.","correct":false,"explanation":"Competition involves firms independently trying to win customers, not coordinating to restrict rivalry. Such coordination is collusion, while its formal monopoly-like form is a cartel."},{"text":"Collusion is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a monopoly.","correct":false,"explanation":"The first term is correct, but monopoly describes a market dominated by one seller, not an agreement among separate firms. A formal collusive agreement is a cartel."},{"text":"Price leadership is coordination to restrict competition; a formal agreement to act like a monopoly is a merger.","correct":false,"explanation":"Price leadership concerns firms following another firm’s price and need not involve explicit coordination. Restrictive coordination is collusion, and a formal agreement is a cartel."}]},{"id":"02d3f9c5-2b82-4c90-be1e-4a9206181e67","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"What are the likely consumer effects of collusion?","back":"

Higher prices.
Less choice.
Reduced consumer surplus.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Higher prices.
Less choice.
Reduced consumer surplus.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Colluding firms restrict rivalry and gain market power, allowing higher prices and less choice. Consumers therefore lose surplus because they pay more and have fewer alternatives."},{"text":"

Lower prices.
More choice.
Increased consumer surplus.

","correct":false,"explanation":"This confuses collusion with stronger competition. Collusion restricts rivalry, so consumers are likely to face higher prices, less choice and reduced consumer surplus."},{"text":"

Lower prices.
Less choice.
Increased consumer surplus.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Collusion weakens rather than intensifies price competition, so lower prices and greater consumer surplus are unlikely. Its typical effects are higher prices, less choice and reduced consumer surplus."},{"text":"

Higher prices.
More choice.
Increased consumer surplus.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Colluding firms generally restrict output and product rivalry rather than expanding consumer options. The likely outcomes are higher prices, less choice and reduced consumer surplus."}]},{"id":"c28055de-4ed2-4a84-b9ce-8cf77c10e29f","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"How can a price war affect the market over time?","back":"

Short run: consumers benefit from lower prices.
Long run: profits and investment may fall.
Exit: survivors may raise prices later.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Short run: consumers benefit from lower prices.
Long run: profits and investment may fall.
Exit: survivors may raise prices later.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Price cuts benefit consumers initially, but sustained low prices compress profits and may weaken investment. If competitors exit, the surviving firms can later increase prices."},{"text":"

Short run: consumers suffer from higher prices.
Long run: profits and investment may rise.
Exit: survivors may cut prices later.

","correct":false,"explanation":"This reverses the usual timeline. Consumers initially benefit from price cuts, but prolonged low profits can reduce investment and force exits, allowing survivors to raise prices later."},{"text":"

Short run: consumers suffer from higher prices.
Long run: profits and investment may fall.
Exit: survivors may raise prices later.

","correct":false,"explanation":"A price war lowers prices in the short run rather than raising them. Over time it may reduce profits and investment, with exit enabling surviving firms to increase prices."},{"text":"

Short run: consumers benefit from lower prices.
Long run: profits and investment may rise.
Exit: survivors may cut prices later.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Price wars compress profit margins rather than increasing them, so long-run investment may decline. Market exit can reduce competition and permit survivors to raise, not lower, prices."}]},{"id":"8154f99b-2c96-4fc6-b804-03736a51194d","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"In game theory, firms are [ ] and their profits are [ ].","back":"In game theory, firms are players and their profits are payoffs.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"In game theory, firms are players and their profits are payoffs.","correct":true,"explanation":"Game theory models each decision-making firm as a player. The resulting profits associated with combinations of strategies are the players’ payoffs."},{"text":"In game theory, firms are rivals and their profits are revenues.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although firms may be rivals and earn revenues, these are not the required game-theory terms. Firms are players, and their resulting profits are payoffs."},{"text":"In game theory, firms are players and their profits are strategies.","correct":false,"explanation":"Firms are correctly called players, but strategies are their possible courses of action, not their profits. The profits resulting from chosen strategies are payoffs."},{"text":"In game theory, firms are strategists and their profits are payoffs.","correct":false,"explanation":"Profits are correctly described as payoffs, but the formal term for participating firms is players, not strategists. Players choose strategies to pursue their payoffs."}]},{"id":"7a6d9a6b-5da2-4b19-9b57-c8e4f9d0cc30","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"A strategy giving the best outcome regardless of the rival’s choice is called what?","back":"A dominant strategy.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A dominant strategy.","correct":true,"explanation":"A dominant strategy produces the best available outcome for a player whatever strategy its rival selects, so its desirability does not depend on the rival’s choice."},{"text":"A Nash equilibrium.","correct":false,"explanation":"A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies from which no player benefits by changing alone. A strategy best regardless of the rival’s choice is a dominant strategy."},{"text":"A dominated strategy.","correct":false,"explanation":"A dominated strategy gives a worse outcome than another available strategy, so it is generally avoided. The best choice regardless of the rival is a dominant strategy."},{"text":"A maximin strategy.","correct":false,"explanation":"A maximin strategy maximises the player’s minimum possible payoff and focuses on the worst-case outcome. Unconditional superiority over alternatives defines a dominant strategy."}]},{"id":"fab21447-f2f2-4b91-abb1-1a57c9656db3","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"In a payoff matrix, what condition identifies a Nash equilibrium?","back":"Each firm chooses its best response; no unilateral incentive to change.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Each firm chooses its best response; no unilateral incentive to change.","correct":true,"explanation":"A Nash equilibrium occurs when every firm is choosing its best response to the others, so no firm can improve its payoff by changing strategy alone."},{"text":"Each firm chooses its dominant strategy; no joint incentive to change.","correct":false,"explanation":"Choosing the highest possible payoff regardless of rivals describes a dominant strategy, not necessarily equilibrium. Nash equilibrium requires each firm’s choice to be its best response to the others."},{"text":"Each firm receives the same payoff; no unilateral incentive to change.","correct":false,"explanation":"A Nash equilibrium does not require equal payoffs or identical choices. It requires that no individual firm can gain by changing its own strategy while others keep theirs unchanged."},{"text":"Each firm chooses a cooperative strategy; maximum joint payoff is achieved.","correct":false,"explanation":"Mutual cooperation may produce a desirable outcome, but it is not the defining condition. Nash equilibrium is identified by each firm choosing a best response with no unilateral gain from switching."}]},{"id":"078a4afd-595e-46ad-9942-7b18624b10d5","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Payoffs: high/high £10m each; A low/B high £14m/£4m; A high/B low £4m/£14m; low/low £6m each. What dominant strategy do both firms have?","back":"Low price.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Low price.","correct":true,"explanation":"Low price is dominant because it gives each firm a higher payoff whether the other firm charges high or low prices: £14m instead of £10m, and £6m instead of £4m."},{"text":"High price","correct":false,"explanation":"High price is attractive when the rival also charges high, but switching to low raises the payoff from £10m to £14m. It therefore is not dominant."},{"text":"Match the other firm’s price","correct":false,"explanation":"Matching the rival’s price is not a strategy that guarantees the highest payoff. Each firm does better by choosing low price in either rival-price situation."},{"text":"No dominant strategy","correct":false,"explanation":"Both firms do have a dominant strategy in this matrix. The mistaken conclusion usually comes from focusing only on the mutually high-price payoff rather than comparing each row or column."}]},{"id":"603066b8-902e-44b5-ae93-5cc5a61825f9","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Using that payoff matrix, what is the Nash equilibrium?","back":"Low price, low price, with £6m each.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Low price, low price, with £6m each.","correct":true,"explanation":"Low price is dominant for both firms, so each chooses low price. The resulting low/low cell is therefore the Nash equilibrium, giving £6m to each firm."},{"text":"High price, high price, with £10m each.","correct":false,"explanation":"High price, high price gives £10m each, but either firm could unilaterally undercut and increase its payoff to £14m. It is therefore not stable as a Nash equilibrium."},{"text":"Low price, high price, with £14m and £4m.","correct":false,"explanation":"At low/high, the high-price firm can switch to low and increase its payoff from £4m to £6m. Because a unilateral improvement exists, this outcome is not a Nash equilibrium."},{"text":"High price, low price, with £4m and £14m.","correct":false,"explanation":"At high/low, the high-price firm can undercut and raise its payoff from £4m to £6m. The outcome is therefore unstable, unlike the low/low result."}]},{"id":"d3041115-1173-430c-9555-c28227b2ae21","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"Why is the payoff matrix a prisoner’s dilemma?","back":"

Mutual high price gives £10m each.
Undercutting is individually profitable.
Outcome is low/low at £6m each.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Mutual high price gives £10m each.
Undercutting is individually profitable.
Outcome is low/low at £6m each.

","correct":true,"explanation":"The matrix is a prisoner’s dilemma because mutual high prices give £10m each, undercutting is individually profitable, and both firms consequently end at low/low with only £6m each."},{"text":"

Mutual low price gives £6m each.
Raising price is individually profitable.
Outcome is high/high at £10m each.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The dilemma is not based on mutual low prices being best. Mutual high price gives the greater joint payoff, while individually rational undercutting drives both firms to low/low at £6m each."},{"text":"

Mutual high price gives £10m each.
Cooperation is individually profitable.
Outcome is high/high at £10m each.

","correct":false,"explanation":"The payoff matrix does not show that cooperation is individually profitable. Each firm can gain by undercutting a high-priced rival, producing the lower-payoff low/low outcome."},{"text":"

Mutual high price gives £10m each.
Undercutting is individually unprofitable.
Outcome is high/low at £4m and £14m.

","correct":false,"explanation":"High/low is not the final stable outcome because the high-price firm can undercut and improve its payoff. The key pattern is profitable undercutting followed by low/low at £6m each."}]},{"id":"c4eba64f-7b71-4415-98ff-bf85b8bf338f","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Allocative efficiency occurs where [ ]; oligopolies often charge price [ ] marginal cost.","back":"Allocative efficiency occurs where $P = MC$; oligopolies often charge price above marginal cost.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Allocative efficiency occurs where $P = MC$; oligopolies often charge price above marginal cost.","correct":true,"explanation":"Allocative efficiency requires price to equal marginal cost, $P = MC$. Oligopolists usually possess market power, allowing them to set price above marginal cost."},{"text":"Allocative efficiency occurs where $P = AC$; oligopolies often charge price above marginal cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"$$P = AC$ concerns covering average cost rather than allocating resources efficiently. Oligopolies generally charge above marginal cost because market power restricts output."},{"text":"Allocative efficiency occurs where $P < MC$; oligopolies often charge price above marginal cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"Allocative efficiency is not achieved where price is below marginal cost, since output is too high relative to the socially efficient level. Oligopolies typically charge above marginal cost."},{"text":"Allocative efficiency occurs where $P = MR$; oligopolies often charge price equal to marginal cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"Oligopoly market power usually creates a positive price-cost margin, so price is above marginal cost. Price equal to marginal revenue is not the allocative-efficiency condition."}]},{"id":"ce739987-7a06-4f06-a8af-0556dea06282","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"Why can oligopoly be productively efficient or X-inefficient?","back":"

Economies of scale can lower average costs.
Weak competition can let costs drift above minimum.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Economies of scale can lower average costs.
Weak competition can let costs drift above minimum.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Large oligopolists may exploit economies of scale to reduce average costs, but weak competitive pressure can also permit organisational slack and costs above the minimum efficient level."},{"text":"

Economies of scale can lower average costs.
Strong competition can force costs above minimum.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Economies of scale can lower average costs, but strong competition does not explain X-inefficiency in this context. Weak rivalry allows costs to drift above the minimum."},{"text":"

Diseconomies of scale can lower average costs.
Weak competition can let costs drift above minimum.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Diseconomies of scale raise average costs rather than lower them. The relevant productive-efficiency benefit is economies of scale, while weak competition may create X-inefficiency."},{"text":"

Economies of scale can lower average costs.
Weak regulation can let costs drift above minimum.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Regulation may affect firms’ behaviour, but it is not the main explanation here. The key contrast is economies of scale lowering average cost and weak competition permitting cost slack."}]},{"id":"4d9e230e-ad8b-4b7d-abb4-ef8abd0e5b8a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can oligopoly support dynamic efficiency?","back":"Supernormal profits can fund investment and innovation.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Supernormal profits can fund investment and innovation.","correct":true,"explanation":"Supernormal profits provide internal finance for research, development, new technology and capital investment, allowing oligopolistic firms to improve products or production methods over time."},{"text":"Normal profits can fund investment and innovation.","correct":false,"explanation":"Normal profits merely cover the opportunity cost of resources and do not provide the same surplus for risky research or major investment. Supernormal profits can fund both."},{"text":"Supernormal profits can fund lower prices and advertising.","correct":false,"explanation":"Supernormal profits can finance investment and innovation, not just lower prices. Reducing prices may benefit consumers but is not the definition of dynamic efficiency."},{"text":"Supernormal profits can ensure minimum average cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"Supernormal profits may support investment and innovation, but dynamic efficiency concerns improvements over time rather than guaranteeing productive efficiency at minimum average cost today."}]},{"id":"64633c46-23ab-4c13-8846-c2afdcc45d34","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"Which market conditions make oligopoly more likely to exploit consumers?","back":"

Strong barriers to entry.
Weak regulation.
Low consumer switching.

","mcqOptions":[{"text":"

Strong barriers to entry.
Weak regulation.
Low consumer switching.

","correct":true,"explanation":"Strong entry barriers protect incumbent firms, weak regulation limits external pressure, and low switching keeps consumers from moving easily to rivals, increasing the scope for exploitation."},{"text":"

Strong barriers to entry.
Weak regulation.
High consumer switching.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Strong barriers to entry and weak regulation can facilitate exploitation, but high consumer switching makes it easier for dissatisfied buyers to leave, reducing firms’ market power."},{"text":"

Easy entry into the market.
Strong regulation.
Low consumer switching.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Easy entry increases the threat of new competitors, while strong regulation constrains exploitative behaviour. Low switching alone does not make all three conditions present."},{"text":"

Weak barriers to entry.
Strong regulation.
High consumer switching.

","correct":false,"explanation":"Strong regulation and high switching generally protect consumers by constraining firms or enabling customers to leave. The exploitative combination is strong entry barriers, weak regulation and low switching."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-10","paperLabel":"Component 1"},"heading":"Oligopoly","title":"Oligopoly Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/a-level/economics/eduqas/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L38"}]}],"topicId":"96f5ed05-443f-59a4-9b1b-a0d4fa436ebe","walled":"$L39"}],"$L3a","$L3b"]