33:I[196793,["/_next/static/chunks/0_zwrmenpyicf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2_6olli-sutu3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zcakt1-boe_f.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0yuh9obhrf6py.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3mz725-y91ph6.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2x_dbpl3b_l2r.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13_9hjun60hj-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2bxmml65nu49g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zkcxwtbsqliz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0d3f1nmeak_z5.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2gjyu-jrwu-fu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/38w1x0vrld4-w.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3jpl-42mbad5n.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3kzt2piec6aoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/19ijf68pshdcn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2os7nxouq91eq.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ml3vooxhiupb.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/04zr-wqafvwoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/10rmxw_yiwj40.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/40lyu17d590zu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2g-t2n9ahs3tn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1g1suj21ijg7y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3lz9pr5v38m4h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2mv9l1xl_aa4j.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0v4byuex1x38h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2oijhb0tdir9b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eanemqjnv2vr.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/44nm8-o05iplc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0llqhg6-bxn_b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ku-vdy4ggo41.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2r29ujce72_54.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2dx-vzwyw9a3g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1coblm1-go81_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jt4ynafgg-jc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0k-y_4mcfub-p.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2cou43phed5q9.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eycy5cqzjdqf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/33z1jiacs_jrz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jo8dxcopjm_t.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3it1o0ex-l5qz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1eyu-5752jh17.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/28uw5fp_u1bnm.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ybwgs28on6c8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0w7ow4sfu0tl_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/24srd-xd1m5z8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/075i0tnxt4not.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2ryoj58czm802.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ksyn9m68446d.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3v6lxgtmi9vqz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13gj59kzq50t_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0g8b6ke39i-ui.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0ixdj_i1afhld.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/30w6c7jj-mxyi.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2qk8b2y5gyu_0.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/12bb60zmzpft7.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1hnuhh5t7cfaj.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/36nndwkz7iik3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1d7tjnrc0fv5y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zg1om_k0m5zv.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1lsxkfxy262n-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717"],"Gingerbread"] 35:I[647935,["/_next/static/chunks/0_zwrmenpyicf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2_6olli-sutu3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zcakt1-boe_f.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0yuh9obhrf6py.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3mz725-y91ph6.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2x_dbpl3b_l2r.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13_9hjun60hj-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2bxmml65nu49g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zkcxwtbsqliz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0d3f1nmeak_z5.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2gjyu-jrwu-fu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/38w1x0vrld4-w.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3jpl-42mbad5n.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3kzt2piec6aoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/19ijf68pshdcn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2os7nxouq91eq.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ml3vooxhiupb.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/04zr-wqafvwoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/10rmxw_yiwj40.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/40lyu17d590zu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2g-t2n9ahs3tn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1g1suj21ijg7y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3lz9pr5v38m4h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2mv9l1xl_aa4j.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0v4byuex1x38h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2oijhb0tdir9b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eanemqjnv2vr.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/44nm8-o05iplc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0llqhg6-bxn_b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ku-vdy4ggo41.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2r29ujce72_54.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2dx-vzwyw9a3g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1coblm1-go81_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jt4ynafgg-jc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0k-y_4mcfub-p.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2cou43phed5q9.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eycy5cqzjdqf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/33z1jiacs_jrz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jo8dxcopjm_t.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3it1o0ex-l5qz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1eyu-5752jh17.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/28uw5fp_u1bnm.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ybwgs28on6c8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0w7ow4sfu0tl_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/24srd-xd1m5z8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/075i0tnxt4not.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2ryoj58czm802.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ksyn9m68446d.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3v6lxgtmi9vqz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13gj59kzq50t_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0g8b6ke39i-ui.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0ixdj_i1afhld.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/30w6c7jj-mxyi.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2qk8b2y5gyu_0.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/12bb60zmzpft7.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1hnuhh5t7cfaj.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/36nndwkz7iik3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1d7tjnrc0fv5y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zg1om_k0m5zv.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1lsxkfxy262n-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717"],"RecordResourceResume"] 36:I[830476,["/_next/static/chunks/0_zwrmenpyicf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2_6olli-sutu3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zcakt1-boe_f.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0yuh9obhrf6py.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3mz725-y91ph6.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2x_dbpl3b_l2r.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13_9hjun60hj-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2bxmml65nu49g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zkcxwtbsqliz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0d3f1nmeak_z5.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2gjyu-jrwu-fu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/38w1x0vrld4-w.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3jpl-42mbad5n.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3kzt2piec6aoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/19ijf68pshdcn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2os7nxouq91eq.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ml3vooxhiupb.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/04zr-wqafvwoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/10rmxw_yiwj40.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/40lyu17d590zu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2g-t2n9ahs3tn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1g1suj21ijg7y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3lz9pr5v38m4h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2mv9l1xl_aa4j.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0v4byuex1x38h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2oijhb0tdir9b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eanemqjnv2vr.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/44nm8-o05iplc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0llqhg6-bxn_b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ku-vdy4ggo41.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2r29ujce72_54.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2dx-vzwyw9a3g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1coblm1-go81_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jt4ynafgg-jc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0k-y_4mcfub-p.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2cou43phed5q9.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eycy5cqzjdqf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/33z1jiacs_jrz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jo8dxcopjm_t.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3it1o0ex-l5qz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1eyu-5752jh17.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/28uw5fp_u1bnm.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ybwgs28on6c8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0w7ow4sfu0tl_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/24srd-xd1m5z8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/075i0tnxt4not.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2ryoj58czm802.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ksyn9m68446d.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3v6lxgtmi9vqz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13gj59kzq50t_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0g8b6ke39i-ui.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0ixdj_i1afhld.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/30w6c7jj-mxyi.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2qk8b2y5gyu_0.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/12bb60zmzpft7.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1hnuhh5t7cfaj.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/36nndwkz7iik3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1d7tjnrc0fv5y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zg1om_k0m5zv.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1lsxkfxy262n-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717"],"FlashcardAccessBranch"] 37:I[315438,["/_next/static/chunks/0_zwrmenpyicf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2_6olli-sutu3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zcakt1-boe_f.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0yuh9obhrf6py.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3mz725-y91ph6.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2x_dbpl3b_l2r.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13_9hjun60hj-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2bxmml65nu49g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zkcxwtbsqliz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0d3f1nmeak_z5.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2gjyu-jrwu-fu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/38w1x0vrld4-w.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3jpl-42mbad5n.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3kzt2piec6aoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/19ijf68pshdcn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2os7nxouq91eq.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ml3vooxhiupb.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/04zr-wqafvwoa.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/10rmxw_yiwj40.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/40lyu17d590zu.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2g-t2n9ahs3tn.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1g1suj21ijg7y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3lz9pr5v38m4h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2mv9l1xl_aa4j.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0v4byuex1x38h.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2oijhb0tdir9b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eanemqjnv2vr.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/44nm8-o05iplc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0llqhg6-bxn_b.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ku-vdy4ggo41.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2r29ujce72_54.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2dx-vzwyw9a3g.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1coblm1-go81_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jt4ynafgg-jc.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0k-y_4mcfub-p.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2cou43phed5q9.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2eycy5cqzjdqf.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/33z1jiacs_jrz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0jo8dxcopjm_t.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3it1o0ex-l5qz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1eyu-5752jh17.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/28uw5fp_u1bnm.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3ybwgs28on6c8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0w7ow4sfu0tl_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/24srd-xd1m5z8.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/075i0tnxt4not.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2ryoj58czm802.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1ksyn9m68446d.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/3v6lxgtmi9vqz.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/13gj59kzq50t_.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0g8b6ke39i-ui.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0ixdj_i1afhld.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/30w6c7jj-mxyi.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/2qk8b2y5gyu_0.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/12bb60zmzpft7.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1hnuhh5t7cfaj.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/36nndwkz7iik3.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1d7tjnrc0fv5y.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/0zg1om_k0m5zv.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717","/_next/static/chunks/1lsxkfxy262n-.js?dpl=nogit-1791196717"],"TopicFlashcardRunner"] 24:[["$","$L33",null,{"feature":"flashcards"}],"$L34",["$","$L35",null,{"href":"/a-level/economics/edexcel/a/government-failure/flashcards","label":"1.4.2 Government failure","subjectCode":"a_level_economics__edexcel_a","surface":"flashcards"}],["$","$L36",null,{"runner":["$","div",null,{"className":"min-h-0 flex-1 overflow-hidden bg-background","children":["$","$L37",null,{"decks":[{"id":"1c0a083e-e67a-41c8-9103-c99f7cdf6647","title":"1.4.2 Government failure Flashcards","topicId":"c01e03e3-3b11-5398-87c8-ca9de130f3d3","topicSlug":"government-failure","cards":[{"id":"676160c7-9984-4b51-a1da-1046404aa7cc","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What must occur for an intervention to count as government failure?","back":"A genuine net welfare loss: intervention leaves resources allocated worse than before.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A genuine net welfare loss: intervention leaves resources allocated worse than before.","correct":true,"explanation":"Government failure occurs only when intervention produces a genuine net welfare loss, meaning resources are allocated less efficiently than they were before the intervention."},{"text":"Any fall in consumer satisfaction: intervention becomes less popular than before.","correct":false,"explanation":"Unpopularity alone does not prove government failure. The necessary condition is a genuine net welfare loss, where intervention leaves resources allocated worse than before."},{"text":"A change in relative prices: intervention alters the market outcome.","correct":false,"explanation":"Changing relative prices is not itself government failure, because intervention is intended to alter market outcomes. Failure requires a genuine net welfare loss compared with before intervention."},{"text":"A reduction in private-sector output: intervention lowers market production.","correct":false,"explanation":"Lower private-sector output may be an intended result of correcting market failure. Government failure requires a genuine net welfare loss, not simply reduced market production."}]},{"id":"1137218e-2ac2-4dd5-95a8-ee9367c9327c","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What causes a net welfare loss?","back":"The costs of the policy outweigh its benefits.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The costs of the policy outweigh its benefits.","correct":true,"explanation":"A net welfare loss occurs when the policy's total costs exceed its benefits. The intervention then reduces overall welfare rather than improving the original outcome."},{"text":"The benefits of the policy outweigh its costs.","correct":false,"explanation":"When benefits exceed costs, the policy creates a net welfare gain rather than a loss. A net welfare loss requires the policy's costs to outweigh its benefits."},{"text":"The costs of the policy equal its benefits.","correct":false,"explanation":"Equal costs and benefits produce no net welfare change, rather than a net welfare loss. A loss arises when the policy's costs exceed the benefits it creates."},{"text":"The policy's benefits increase faster than its costs.","correct":false,"explanation":"Benefits increasing faster than costs indicates an improving net welfare position. The relevant condition for a net welfare loss is that policy costs outweigh its benefits."}]},{"id":"795968a8-dcd0-45db-9d37-1f64385973ce","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Compared with what benchmark is government failure judged?","back":"Resources become allocated worse than under the original market failure.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Resources become allocated worse than under the original market failure.","correct":true,"explanation":"Government failure is judged against the situation created by the original market failure. Intervention fails when it makes resource allocation worse than that initial situation."},{"text":"Resources become allocated better than under the original market failure.","correct":false,"explanation":"Improving allocation compared with the original market failure indicates successful intervention, not government failure. Failure requires allocation to become worse than the original situation."},{"text":"Resources become allocated the same as under the original market failure.","correct":false,"explanation":"Leaving resource allocation unchanged may mean the policy has had little effect, but it is not necessarily government failure. Failure requires a worse allocation than before."},{"text":"Resources become allocated according to government priorities rather than market demand.","correct":false,"explanation":"Government priorities can legitimately guide intervention to correct market failure. The benchmark is whether allocation becomes worse than under the original market failure."}]},{"id":"f40b2de8-e1d3-4242-b114-59cd2243eb04","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why is an unpopular policy outcome not automatically government failure?","back":"An unpopular outcome is not enough; there must be a genuine net welfare loss.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"An unpopular outcome is not enough; there must be a genuine net welfare loss.","correct":true,"explanation":"Policies can be unpopular while still increasing overall welfare. Government failure requires evidence that intervention creates a genuine net welfare loss, not merely dissatisfaction."},{"text":"An unpopular outcome proves government failure because consumer preferences are always decisive.","correct":false,"explanation":"Popularity does not measure total welfare, and consumer preferences are not always decisive in correcting externalities or public-good problems. A genuine net welfare loss is required."},{"text":"An unpopular outcome proves government failure because taxes must reduce individual income.","correct":false,"explanation":"Reduced disposable income may be an intended consequence of taxation, especially for correcting harmful consumption. Unpopularity alone is insufficient without a genuine net welfare loss."},{"text":"An unpopular outcome proves government failure because markets always allocate resources efficiently.","correct":false,"explanation":"Markets can fail through externalities, information gaps and other problems, so intervention may improve allocation despite being unpopular. Failure requires a genuine net welfare loss."}]},{"id":"0473d2d3-1405-48db-a5cf-d8dfcbf31daa","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can a price ceiling distort price signals?","back":"A price ceiling can prevent the market from clearing, creating a shortage.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A price ceiling can prevent the market from clearing, creating a shortage.","correct":true,"explanation":"A binding price ceiling keeps price below the market-clearing level. Quantity demanded then exceeds quantity supplied, producing a shortage and distorting the market signal."},{"text":"A price ceiling can prevent the market from clearing, creating a surplus.","correct":false,"explanation":"A binding price ceiling below equilibrium encourages demand and discourages supply, so it creates a shortage. A surplus is associated with a price floor above equilibrium."},{"text":"A price ceiling can prevent the market from clearing, creating a higher equilibrium price.","correct":false,"explanation":"A binding ceiling restricts the legal price below equilibrium; it does not create a higher equilibrium price. The resulting imbalance is excess demand, or a shortage."},{"text":"A price ceiling can prevent the market from clearing, creating a fall in quantity demanded.","correct":false,"explanation":"The lower controlled price normally increases quantity demanded while reducing quantity supplied. The difference between them is a shortage, not a fall in demand."}]},{"id":"01714edf-427d-4046-b7a2-9a30621535e1","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can a subsidy distort price signals?","back":"A subsidy can weaken price signals and cause overproduction.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A subsidy can weaken price signals and cause overproduction.","correct":true,"explanation":"A subsidy lowers producers' effective costs and can encourage output beyond the socially optimal level. This weakens the price signal and may create overproduction."},{"text":"A subsidy can weaken price signals and cause underproduction.","correct":false,"explanation":"Subsidies generally reduce production costs and encourage firms to supply more. Underproduction is therefore the wrong direction; the risk is output exceeding the social optimum."},{"text":"A subsidy can weaken price signals and cause lower quantity demanded.","correct":false,"explanation":"A subsidy usually lowers the price paid by consumers or raises producer receipts, tending to increase quantity demanded or supplied. It does not normally cause lower demand."},{"text":"A subsidy can weaken price signals and cause market-clearing prices to rise without extra output.","correct":false,"explanation":"The usual concern is that subsidies encourage additional output and consumption, moving production beyond the social optimum. They do not simply raise prices without affecting output."}]},{"id":"6b3eeae5-4901-4f1f-bc6a-1740e9ffcd34","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why can distorted price signals cause government failure?","back":"Shortages or surpluses may create a welfare loss greater than the original market failure.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Shortages or surpluses may create a welfare loss greater than the original market failure.","correct":true,"explanation":"Intervention can distort price signals and produce shortages or surpluses. If the resulting welfare loss exceeds the initial market failure, the intervention itself becomes government failure."},{"text":"Shortages or surpluses may create a welfare loss smaller than the original market failure.","correct":false,"explanation":"A smaller welfare loss would represent an improvement, even if intervention is imperfect. Government failure requires the intervention-induced loss to be greater than the original market failure."},{"text":"Shortages or surpluses may create a welfare gain equal to the original market failure.","correct":false,"explanation":"A welfare gain indicates improvement rather than failure, and equality with the original failure does not establish a net loss. Failure occurs when intervention creates a greater loss."},{"text":"Shortages or surpluses may create a welfare loss unrelated to the original market failure.","correct":false,"explanation":"The comparison with the original market failure determines whether intervention has worsened welfare. An unrelated loss does not provide the relevant benchmark for identifying government failure."}]},{"id":"66e63573-0429-485a-9b38-f758862b19a4","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"What unintended consequence can follow a heavy tax or ban?","back":"A black market may form after a heavy tax or ban.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A black market may form after a heavy tax or ban.","correct":true,"explanation":"A heavy tax or ban can push legal prices up or eliminate legal supply. Consumers and suppliers may then trade illegally, creating a black market."},{"text":"A competitive market may form after a heavy tax or ban.","correct":false,"explanation":"Heavy taxes or bans usually restrict legal trade rather than create a new competitive legal market. The unintended consequence is that illegal trading may develop as a black market."},{"text":"A public good may form after a heavy tax or ban.","correct":false,"explanation":"A public good is defined by non-rivalry and non-excludability, not by restrictions on a product. Heavy taxes or bans can instead encourage a black market."},{"text":"A price floor may form after a heavy tax or ban.","correct":false,"explanation":"A price floor is a legal minimum price, whereas a black market is illegal trade outside official channels. Heavy taxes or bans can encourage the latter."}]},{"id":"8d3e5ed2-8a0c-4fbe-b4f7-32137cc58c45","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can an unintended consequence worsen the original problem?","back":"Activity may shift somewhere harder to tax or police, worsening the original problem.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Activity may shift somewhere harder to tax or police, worsening the original problem.","correct":true,"explanation":"An intervention can displace activity into informal or illegal channels. This makes it harder to tax or police and may allow the original harmful activity to worsen."},{"text":"Activity may shift somewhere easier to tax or police, worsening the original problem.","correct":false,"explanation":"Activity becoming easier to monitor would generally improve enforcement and reduce the problem. Government failure can arise when activity shifts somewhere harder to tax or police."},{"text":"Activity may shift somewhere more profitable for the government to regulate, eliminating the original problem.","correct":false,"explanation":"A shift that eliminates the original problem is a beneficial outcome, not a worsening. The relevant unintended consequence is movement into activity harder to tax or police."},{"text":"Activity may shift somewhere with greater legal transparency, worsening the original problem.","correct":false,"explanation":"Greater legal transparency usually helps authorities monitor and regulate activity. The damaging shift is towards a setting harder to tax or police."}]},{"id":"f6655929-90b5-48e9-8472-72076767d17a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"When are administrative costs excessive?","back":"A policy's running and enforcement costs outweigh the welfare it creates.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"A policy's running and enforcement costs outweigh the welfare it creates.","correct":true,"explanation":"Administrative costs are excessive when the resources spent operating and enforcing a policy exceed the welfare improvement it generates. The policy then creates a net welfare loss."},{"text":"A policy's running and enforcement costs are lower than the welfare it creates.","correct":false,"explanation":"Costs lower than the welfare created indicate that administration is worthwhile and produces a net gain. Costs become excessive when they outweigh the welfare created."},{"text":"A policy's running and enforcement costs equal the tax revenue it collects.","correct":false,"explanation":"Tax revenue is not the relevant benchmark for administrative costs because revenue may not equal social welfare. The comparison must be with the welfare the policy creates."},{"text":"A policy's running and enforcement costs rise whenever the policy changes behaviour.","correct":false,"explanation":"Changing behaviour can be the intended purpose of policy and does not by itself make administration excessive. Excessiveness depends on costs outweighing welfare created."}]},{"id":"c0a060f9-140d-4493-bc49-14a181998b84","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How do excessive administrative costs reduce welfare?","back":"Resources are absorbed by administration instead of being used for a better alternative.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Resources are absorbed by administration instead of being used for a better alternative.","correct":true,"explanation":"Excessive administration uses staff, funds and other resources that could generate more welfare elsewhere. This opportunity cost reduces the overall benefit of the policy."},{"text":"Resources are absorbed by administration instead of being used for a less effective alternative.","correct":false,"explanation":"Diverting resources from a less effective alternative would not necessarily reduce welfare. The problem is that administration prevents resources being used for a better alternative."},{"text":"Resources are absorbed by administration instead of being used for a higher tax rate.","correct":false,"explanation":"The issue is not whether resources could fund a higher tax rate. Excessive administrative costs reduce welfare because resources cannot be used for a better alternative."},{"text":"Resources are absorbed by administration instead of being used for a larger government department.","correct":false,"explanation":"Expanding a department is not automatically a welfare-improving alternative. The economic point is the opportunity cost of administration compared with a better use of resources."}]},{"id":"29a3f646-b7a4-4875-9d32-441db91f46d2","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why do information gaps create government failure?","back":"The government lacks the information needed to identify the true social optimum.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The government lacks the information needed to identify the true social optimum.","correct":true,"explanation":"Without accurate information about external costs, benefits and responses, the government may not know the output or price that maximises social welfare - the true social optimum."},{"text":"The government lacks the information needed to identify the private market equilibrium.","correct":false,"explanation":"The government can often observe market prices and quantities, but government failure concerns identifying the socially optimal outcome rather than merely the private equilibrium."},{"text":"The government lacks the information needed to identify the highest possible tax revenue.","correct":false,"explanation":"Maximising tax revenue is not the same as maximising social welfare. Information gaps create failure when they prevent identification of the true social optimum."},{"text":"The government lacks the information needed to identify the lowest possible production cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"The lowest production cost alone does not determine the socially optimal output because external benefits and costs also matter. The missing target is the true social optimum."}]},{"id":"0d5969e3-57e9-4fdf-9f2f-8da25bc26905","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What happens when a government sets a tax, subsidy or cap at the wrong level?","back":"The policy may over-correct or under-correct, pushing output away from the social optimum.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The policy may over-correct or under-correct, pushing output away from the social optimum.","correct":true,"explanation":"An incorrectly calibrated tax, subsidy or cap can change output by too much or too little. Either error can leave production away from the socially optimal level."},{"text":"The policy may always correct perfectly, pushing output towards the social optimum.","correct":false,"explanation":"Setting the policy at the wrong level creates a risk of over-correction or under-correction, not perfect correction. Accurate calibration is needed to reach the social optimum."},{"text":"The policy may under-correct only, pushing output below the social optimum.","correct":false,"explanation":"A policy set at the wrong level can move output either too far or not far enough. It may over-correct as well as under-correct, in either direction."},{"text":"The policy may remove all incentives to respond, leaving output at the social optimum.","correct":false,"explanation":"Taxes, subsidies and caps are designed to alter incentives or constrain output, and a wrong level can worsen allocation. They do not guarantee the social optimum."}]},{"id":"ee210d87-5d04-4df3-9532-bbb10f69312a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can rent controls harm the people they aim to help?","back":"Rent controls can keep rents down while creating a housing shortage.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Rent controls can keep rents down while creating a housing shortage.","correct":true,"explanation":"A binding rent ceiling keeps rents below the market-clearing level. More people want housing while landlords supply less, creating a shortage that can harm intended beneficiaries."},{"text":"Rent controls can keep rents down while creating a housing surplus.","correct":false,"explanation":"A rent ceiling below equilibrium increases quantity demanded and reduces quantity supplied, causing a shortage. A surplus would arise from a sufficiently high price floor."},{"text":"Rent controls can keep rents down while creating a housing shortage only for landlords.","correct":false,"explanation":"The shortage concerns available housing for potential tenants, not a shortage experienced only by landlords. Controlled rents can reduce supply and leave households unable to find homes."},{"text":"Rent controls can keep rents down while creating a housing market with excess supply.","correct":false,"explanation":"Keeping rents below equilibrium makes demand exceed supply, so the market has excess demand. Reduced landlord incentives do not create excess supply."}]},{"id":"4380f781-5ed5-4058-a52c-5493c21a2a0d","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can farm subsidies cause government failure?","back":"Farm subsidies can support inefficient producers and create wasteful surpluses, such as butter mountains.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Farm subsidies can support inefficient producers and create wasteful surpluses, such as butter mountains.","correct":true,"explanation":"Subsidies can keep high-cost farms operating and encourage production beyond demand or the social optimum. The resulting surplus uses resources wastefully, as with butter mountains."},{"text":"Farm subsidies can support inefficient producers and create shortages, such as butter mountains.","correct":false,"explanation":"Subsidies generally encourage producers to supply more, making surpluses more likely. Butter mountains are a familiar example of excess stocks, not shortages."},{"text":"Farm subsidies can support efficient producers and create lower production without stock accumulation, such as butter mountains.","correct":false,"explanation":"Subsidies may support inefficient producers and encourage excessive production. Butter mountains refer to accumulated surplus stocks, so lower production without accumulation is incorrect."},{"text":"Farm subsidies can support inefficient producers and create higher-quality imports, such as butter mountains.","correct":false,"explanation":"The classic concern is domestic overproduction and accumulated surplus, not higher-quality imports. Supporting inefficient producers can generate wasteful surpluses such as butter mountains."}]},{"id":"8a36bc70-f671-4542-bd26-72f5878b83f5","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"What unintended consequence may result from very high tobacco taxes?","back":"Very high tobacco taxes can encourage smuggling and an illegal market.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Very high tobacco taxes can encourage smuggling and an illegal market.","correct":true,"explanation":"Very high tobacco taxes create a large price difference between legal and illegal supply. This increases the incentive to smuggle tobacco and trade through an illegal market."},{"text":"Very high tobacco taxes can encourage domestic production and a legal market.","correct":false,"explanation":"High taxes can make legal tobacco less attractive and create incentives for untaxed supply. The likely unintended consequence is smuggling and an illegal market."},{"text":"Very high tobacco taxes can encourage lower smuggling and a smaller illegal market.","correct":false,"explanation":"Although taxes may reduce legal consumption, very high rates can increase the rewards from evasion. That makes smuggling and illegal trade more attractive, not less."},{"text":"Very high tobacco taxes can encourage overproduction and a larger legal market.","correct":false,"explanation":"High tobacco taxes raise the legal price and normally discourage legal sales. Their unintended consequence may be smuggling and illegal trading rather than legal overproduction."}]},{"id":"76a3992d-a512-486d-859d-57280e8c8640","cardType":"basic","points":1,"front":"Is government failure inevitable?","back":"Government failure is a risk to manage, not a certainty.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Government failure is a risk to manage, not a certainty.","correct":true,"explanation":"Government intervention can improve outcomes, but imperfect information, implementation costs and behavioural responses create risks. Careful evaluation and adjustment can reduce those risks rather than making failure unavoidable."},{"text":"Government failure is a certainty to accept, not a risk.","correct":false,"explanation":"Intervention does not automatically fail; many policies improve welfare when designed and evaluated carefully. Treating failure as certain ignores the possibility of managing information, design and behavioural risks."},{"text":"Government failure is a problem to eliminate, not a possibility.","correct":false,"explanation":"Some risk remains because policymakers cannot predict every response or consequence. The appropriate aim is to reduce and manage government failure, not assume it can be eliminated completely."},{"text":"Government failure is a benefit to maximise, not a cost.","correct":false,"explanation":"Government failure reduces welfare when intervention produces costs or distortions exceeding its benefits. It is therefore a risk requiring management, rather than an outcome policymakers should seek."}]},{"id":"006e6ae3-a35c-4cf1-a2b0-16030788143a","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"How can governments reduce the risk of government failure?","back":"Risk can be reduced through evidence, policy pilots and flexible market-based tools.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Risk can be reduced through evidence, policy pilots and flexible market-based tools.","correct":true,"explanation":"Evidence improves decisions, pilots reveal unintended effects before wider implementation, and flexible market-based tools allow agents to respond efficiently. Together, these approaches reduce the likelihood and scale of failure."},{"text":"Risk can be reduced through political targets, immediate nationwide rules and fixed command tools.","correct":false,"explanation":"Rigid nationwide intervention can magnify errors before results are known, while political targets may prioritise visibility over welfare. Evidence, pilots and flexible market-based tools provide safer learning and adjustment."},{"text":"Risk can be reduced through limited evidence, permanent subsidies and detailed quantity controls.","correct":false,"explanation":"Weak evidence increases information errors, and permanent subsidies or quantity controls can distort incentives and create shortages or surpluses. Testing policies and retaining flexibility better limits government failure."},{"text":"Risk can be reduced through central planning, universal bans and unchanging administrative rules.","correct":false,"explanation":"Centralised and inflexible measures struggle to account for changing conditions and diverse responses. Evidence, small-scale testing and adaptable incentives are more effective ways to identify and correct policy problems."}]},{"id":"6bcb6e28-5f14-4848-99e8-13715e5ed0e9","cardType":"basic","points":2,"front":"Why can government failure occur despite careful policy design?","back":"Even well-designed policies can cause unintended consequences because agents adapt their behaviour.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"Even well-designed policies can cause unintended consequences because agents adapt their behaviour.","correct":true,"explanation":"Households and firms respond to incentives created by intervention. Those responses may differ from policymakers’ expectations, changing outcomes and generating unintended costs even when the original policy design appears sound."},{"text":"Even well-designed policies can cause unintended consequences because agents ignore their incentives.","correct":false,"explanation":"People and firms generally respond to changed costs, benefits and restrictions rather than ignoring them. These behavioural adaptations, not a complete absence of response, can undermine an otherwise careful policy."},{"text":"Even well-designed policies can cause unintended consequences because markets always correct intervention.","correct":false,"explanation":"Markets do not automatically neutralise every policy effect, especially when intervention changes incentives or prices. Behavioural adaptation can instead produce distortions that policymakers did not anticipate."},{"text":"Even well-designed policies can cause unintended consequences because governments control all responses.","correct":false,"explanation":"Governments cannot fully control how consumers, workers and firms react to intervention. Their independent responses create uncertainty and may produce outcomes different from those predicted during policy design."}]},{"id":"0b1991d8-3c6d-4851-8cc7-19fbe431a021","cardType":"basic","points":3,"front":"What three factors influence the risk of government failure?","back":"The likelihood depends on information quality, policy design and agents' responses.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"The likelihood depends on information quality, policy design and agents' responses.","correct":true,"explanation":"Accurate information helps identify the problem, sound design determines how intervention works, and agents’ responses shape its actual effects. Weakness in any of these areas raises the risk of failure."},{"text":"The likelihood depends on government size, tax revenue and firms' profits.","correct":false,"explanation":"These measures may describe the economy but do not directly determine whether intervention fails. The key influences are the quality of information, the policy’s design and how agents respond."},{"text":"The likelihood depends on market concentration, inflation rates and consumer confidence.","correct":false,"explanation":"Those conditions can affect policy context, but they are not the three core determinants of government failure. Information quality, policy design and behavioural responses directly shape intervention outcomes."},{"text":"The likelihood depends on election timing, public spending and national income.","correct":false,"explanation":"Political timing and macroeconomic totals may influence decisions, yet they do not by themselves establish policy success or failure. Failure risk primarily reflects information, design and agents’ reactions."}]},{"id":"2f493d9f-bd87-4199-924e-8fec94d3adc8","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"A policy creates government failure when its costs exceed its [ ].","back":"A policy creates government failure when its costs exceed its benefits.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"benefits","correct":true,"explanation":"Government failure occurs when intervention reduces total welfare: its administrative, enforcement and distortionary costs exceed the benefits generated by correcting the original problem."},{"text":"revenues","correct":false,"explanation":"Tax or fee revenue is a financial flow, not the complete welfare gain from intervention. The relevant comparison is between total policy costs and the benefits created by addressing the problem."},{"text":"outputs","correct":false,"explanation":"Higher production or measured output does not necessarily mean higher welfare, particularly if intervention creates costs or pollution. Government failure is assessed by comparing overall costs with benefits."},{"text":"tax receipts","correct":false,"explanation":"Tax receipts can fund government activity but do not measure its net welfare effect. The policy fails when its full costs exceed its welfare benefits, regardless of revenue collected."}]},{"id":"d4a5ac4f-707f-4564-a5a5-30027983b5f5","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Distorted price signals can stop the market from [ ].","back":"Distorted price signals can stop the market from clearing.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"clearing","correct":true,"explanation":"A market clears when quantity supplied equals quantity demanded at the prevailing price. Distorted signals can prevent this adjustment, leaving a shortage or surplus."},{"text":"expanding","correct":false,"explanation":"Markets do not need to expand in order to function efficiently; they need demand and supply to adjust towards equality. Distorted prices specifically obstruct market clearing."},{"text":"innovating","correct":false,"explanation":"Innovation may improve products or production methods, but it is not the condition describing equality between quantity demanded and supplied. Distorted price signals primarily prevent clearing."},{"text":"specialising","correct":false,"explanation":"Specialisation concerns the division of production between individuals or firms. Market clearing instead concerns whether quantity demanded matches quantity supplied, which distorted prices can prevent."}]},{"id":"5fbb5b51-7b73-4cc5-aedc-f315850013e5","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"An information gap means the government may set intervention at the [ ].","back":"An information gap means the government may set intervention at the wrong level.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"wrong level","correct":true,"explanation":"Without reliable information about costs, benefits or behavioural responses, policymakers may choose an intervention that is too large or too small to maximise welfare."},{"text":"efficient level","correct":false,"explanation":"An information gap makes it difficult to identify the welfare-maximising intervention, so efficiency cannot be assumed. The likely problem is selecting an intervention at an inappropriate level."},{"text":"average level","correct":false,"explanation":"Using an average does not solve missing information about the specific costs, benefits and responses relevant to the policy. The intervention may therefore be set at an unsuitable level."},{"text":"market level","correct":false,"explanation":"The market outcome is not automatically the correct intervention target when a market failure exists. Incomplete information can still cause government to choose the wrong extent of intervention."}]},{"id":"ba65d0e6-21c4-4079-bab0-3faea9fe16f1","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Excessive administrative and enforcement costs make the policy's net gain [ ].","back":"Excessive administrative and enforcement costs make the policy's net gain smaller or negative.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"smaller or negative","correct":true,"explanation":"Administrative and enforcement expenses reduce the welfare gain from intervention. If these costs are sufficiently large, they can eliminate the gain entirely and turn the policy’s net effect negative."},{"text":"larger and positive","correct":false,"explanation":"Extra administrative and enforcement costs subtract from, rather than add to, welfare gains. They make the net gain smaller and can eventually make it negative."},{"text":"constant and neutral","correct":false,"explanation":"Implementation costs directly affect the policy’s net welfare outcome, so they cannot be treated as neutral. Ignoring them overstates the benefits and may conceal government failure."},{"text":"uncertain but beneficial","correct":false,"explanation":"Although the final effect may be uncertain, high implementation costs do not guarantee a benefit. They can reduce the gain below zero, which is why net welfare must include them."}]},{"id":"2bcb153f-d740-44c4-857e-775785f21c2b","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"Government failure requires a genuine [ ].","back":"Government failure requires a genuine net welfare loss.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"net welfare loss","correct":true,"explanation":"Government failure is not merely an imperfect policy or an unintended consequence. It requires intervention to leave society worse off overall after all benefits, costs and distortions are considered."},{"text":"gross policy cost","correct":false,"explanation":"A policy can have substantial costs while still generating larger welfare benefits. Failure depends on the overall net effect, not the size of costs considered in isolation."},{"text":"political disagreement","correct":false,"explanation":"Disagreement may accompany controversial intervention but does not establish an economic failure. The defining test is whether the policy produces a negative net welfare outcome."},{"text":"temporary market change","correct":false,"explanation":"Markets may change temporarily without society losing welfare overall. Government failure requires the intervention’s total costs and distortions to outweigh its resulting benefits."}]},{"id":"996a24c7-b2df-40ae-9d12-4f0145d39814","cardType":"cloze","points":null,"front":"A policy should be judged against the welfare created by the original [ ].","back":"A policy should be judged against the welfare created by the original market failure.","mcqOptions":[{"text":"market failure","correct":true,"explanation":"The relevant counterfactual is the welfare outcome without intervention, where the original market failure remains. A policy is worthwhile only if its benefits exceed its costs relative to that baseline."},{"text":"government budget","correct":false,"explanation":"The budget records public financial flows, not the welfare that would have existed without intervention. Evaluation must compare the policy with the original market outcome and its failure."},{"text":"political objective","correct":false,"explanation":"Political aims may motivate a policy but do not provide the correct economic benchmark. The comparison must assess welfare against what occurred under the original market failure."},{"text":"administrative process","correct":false,"explanation":"Administrative procedures measure how intervention is delivered, not the welfare baseline used for evaluation. The correct benchmark is the original market failure that intervention seeks to address."}]}]}],"examCountdown":{"examDate":"2027-05-10","paperLabel":"Paper 1"},"heading":"1.4.2 Government failure","title":"1.4.2 Government failure Flashcards","topbar":{"backHref":"/a-level/economics/edexcel/a/flashcards"},"topicSidebar":"$L38"}]}],"topicId":"c01e03e3-3b11-5398-87c8-ca9de130f3d3","walled":"$L39"}],"$L3a","$L3b"]